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As the Senators pointed out, art lost in the Holocaust is not 
just important for its aesthetic and cultural value. Restitution 
is so much more, much more than that, than reclaiming a 
material good, and this is what I learned by playing Maria 
Altmann.  Restoring physical parts of lost heritage to 
Holocaust victims and their families is a moral imperative…. 
Art restitution is about preserving the fundamental human 
condition.  It gives Jewish people and other victims of the 
Nazi terror the opportunity to reclaim their history, their 
culture, their memories, and most importantly, their 
families…. Art is a reflection of memories and is shared 
across familial and cultural lines. When the Jewish people 
were dispossessed of their art, they lost their heritage.  
Memories were taken along with the art. And to have no 
memories is like having no family. And that is why art 
restitution is so imperative. 
 
Testimony from Dame Helen Mirren to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on June 7, 2016.1   
 
* Jennifer Anglim Kreder is a Professor of Law at the NKU-Chase College of 
Law. She has been involved in Holocaust-era and art litigation since 1999 and 
formerly worked at Milbank Tweed in New York City. For more information, 
see JenniferKreder.com. 
** Virginia Leigh Schell, J.D., NKU-Chase College of Law. 
1 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their 
Lost Heritage: Hearing on S. 2763, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 
Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and 
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 
114th Cong. 1 (2016) (testimony by Dame Helen Mirren).    
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In the 2015 film Woman in Gold, Dame Helen Mirren 
portrayed Maria Altmann, a Holocaust survivor who engaged in 
extensive efforts to recover a stolen portrait of her aunt by the artist 
Gustav Klimt, Adele Bloch-Bauer I (commonly known as Woman 
in Gold), from the Austrian government.2  The painting was stolen 
by the Nazis after Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Adele’s widower, fled 
Austria following the German Anschluss.  The United States 
Supreme Court accepted the Austrian government’s 2004 petition 
for certiorari on the issue of whether a foreign government could be 
sued in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.3  The Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the 
FSIA were indeed retroactive to 1945 and applied to Ms. Altmann’s 
case.4  The Court’s ruling lead to arbitration between Ms. Altmann 
and Austria, which resulted in an order for the return of the painting 
to Ms. Altmann.5 
Maria Altmann’s initial struggle is the story of many 
Holocaust survivors who have faced museums and private collectors 
intent on keeping art they should have at least suspected was stolen 
by the Nazis.  But, unlike many survivors and their descendants, Ms. 
Altmann, aided by a great attorney, had the ability to locate the 
stolen painting and to pursue legal action against the government of 
Austria for its return.  Unfortunately, Ms. Altmann’s victory in the 
United States Supreme Court and the arbitration with Austria that 
followed is the outlier in the adjudications of Holocaust 
expropriated art.  For most Holocaust survivors and their 
descendants, their stories are those of defeat with no opportunity to 
have their day in court, mostly due to application of procedural rules 
severely restricting their ability to file suit or have their cases heard 
on the merits. 
 
2 Woman in Gold (2015) https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2404425/ 
3 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).  
4 Id. 
5 Ms. Altmann offered the Republic of Austria the opportunity to purchase the 
painting so it could stay in Austria, but Austria declined her offer replying that it 
could not afford the painting. See Art of the Heist: The Lady in Gold (2008) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ifi3FMtF8uQ. 
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Relying on extensive research of Ms. Altmann6 studied in 
preparation for the movie, Dame Mirren appeared before Congress 
to support the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (“HEAR 
Act”) on June 7, 2016, while the legislation was under consideration 
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, its Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, and its Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, 
Federal Rights and Federal Courts.7  Dame Mirren testified before 
the committees regarding the difficulties faced by Holocaust 
survivors and their descendants in their efforts to retrieve their stolen 
property.8  Despite the passage of nearly three quarters of a century, 
Holocaust survivors and their descendants are still attempting to 
piece together their cultural and familial history that was 
systematically plundered and destroyed by the Nazis, and others, 
during World War II and the decades thereafter.9  As Dame Mirren 
noted, restitution of stolen art and other cultural property to the 
victims of the Third Reich is not just about correcting a theft of 
something financially valuable.10 Restitution is about the restoration 
of culture to Jewish and other communities, their families, and, most 
importantly, honoring their memories, all of which the Third Reich 
attempted to obliterate.11 
 
 
6Maria Altmann died on February 7, 2011, at the age of 95. 
http://www.legacy.com/ns/maria-altmann-obituary/148464498.   
7 Senate committee report to S. 2763 at pg. 6 
8 See https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/s-2763-the-holocaust-
expropriated-art-recovery-act_reuniting-victims-with-their-lost-heritage 
9   Id.  
10 Id. Ms. Altmann explained that her dispute with Austria was not about the 
money, but rather justice.  She said, “They are getting away with a lie, saying 
‘It’s ours, not yours.’”  See 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/howard-reich/ct-woman-
gold-reflections-20150404-column.html. See also U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663 
F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Austrian government required Holocaust 
victims to make “donations” of art to Austria’s national collection before 
issuing export permits for the restitution of Nazi-looted art.). 
11 Id.  
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Approximately six months after hearing testimony from 
Dame Mirren and the experts involved in the field of Holocaust 
expropriated art, Congress enacted with unanimous bipartisan 
support the HEAR Act to address problems faced by Holocaust 
survivors and their heirs in recovering artwork looted during the 
Holocaust-era. This article addresses recent literature maintaining 
that the HEAR Act is unconstitutional because its statute of 
limitations provision purportedly interferes with principles of 
federalism. Part One provides an overview of the relevant history 
from the Nazis’ rise to power through the end of World War II that 
serves as the backdrop for the provisions set forth in the HEAR Act 
and key cases demonstrating the problems the HEAR Act addresses. 
Part Two discusses the HEAR Act itself.  Part Three reviews the 
constitutional authority granted to Congress and the Executive 
Branch in the areas of federal preemption and foreign policy.  Part 
Four demonstrates the constitutionality of the HEAR Act.  Part Five 
briefly concludes that the HEAR Act is constitutional and does not 
interfere with principles of federalism. 
 
II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
PRECEDING THE HEAR ACT 
 
A.  The Nazis Rise to Power and World War II- 1933 to 1945 
 
The Nazis rose to power in a climate rife with severe 
economic depression and anti-Semitism as Europe tried to stabilize 
following World War I.  The Nazis blamed European Jews for 
Germany’s failures and misfortunes during World I and thereafter.12 
Once Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933, the Nazis and their 
extreme nationalistic government were unstoppable.13  Their goal of 
 
12 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Review of Steven E. Aschheim, Brothers and Sisters: 
The East European Jew in German and German-Jewish Consciousness, 6 
Modern Judaism 311 (1986).  
13 See Wilfred F. Knapp, Adolf Hitler: Dictator 1933-39, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, https://www.britannica/biography/Adolf-Hitler/Dictator-1933-39 
[https://perma.cc/XUY2-CR6Y] (stating that Hitler quickly became a dictator 
once in power). 
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Aryanization of the Germanic culture would ultimately manifest in 
the “Final Solution,” Nazi code for the worldwide destruction of the 
Jewish people and their culture.14  This plan included pillaging the 
Jews and confiscating all their wealth and assets with the goal of 
either destroying it entirely or profiting from it. To execute this plan, 
the Nazis operated as a criminal network under the guise of the 
law.15  They “legally” confiscated Jewish assets pursuant to their 
laws.16  Due to the economic depression in Germany, the Nazis 
needed Jewish wealth to fund their occupation of Europe and the 
Final Solution.17  The Nazis also engaged in the deliberate and 
systematic destruction of the Jewish people and their culture to 
further their goals of European Aryanization.18   
 
In 1935, the Nazis began passing the Nuremberg Laws to 
target Jews and other minorities whom they deemed unfit for Aryan 
culture.19  One of the Nuremberg Laws passed in 1938 required Jews 
who possessed more than 5000 Reichsmarks of property to 
periodically declare and inventory their assets with the Nazi 
Property Control Office, and they were prohibited from selling their 
property without permission from the government.20  Any Jews who 
wanted to emigrate from Germany had to pay an enormous exit tax, 
colloquially known as the “flight tax,” to the German government 
that effectively stripped these Jews of most of their wealth.21  To 
make their thefts appear as legal and ordinary government action, 
 
14 See https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/world/europe/27iht-berlin27.html. 
15  Id.  
16 Id.  
17 It is estimated that approximately one-third of the money for the Nazi war 




20 Gotz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare 
State 42 (Jefferson Chase trans., Metro Books 2005); Harold James, The 
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the Nazi government obsessively documented these transactions.22  
The property stolen from the Jews included art by some of the 
world’s most esteemed artists, Old Masters like Rembrandt and 
disdained Post-Impressionists such as van Gogh, Matisse, and more 
modern (then) lesser-known artists such as Gustav Klimt and his 
student Egon Schiele.23   
 
The Nazis were obsessed with expelling modern art, coined 
“degenerate art” by Hitler, from the continent.24  In his youth, Hitler 
was a failed artist who believed he had great artistic talent.25  But, 
he was rejected by those in the popular avant-garde art community 
of the time (many of whom were leftist-leaning)26 because of his 
preference for painting bland, unoriginal watercolors.  Hitler found 
modern art and its rejection of formal, traditional artistic styles in 
favor of abstract expressionist styles offensive.  He believed art 
should be symmetrical, realistic, and natural, and described modern 
art as “a great and fatal illness” because it did not fit into the mold 
of what he thought great art should be.27  Many of the successful 
artists of the time were also Jewish and/or Communist.  Thus, Hitler 
 
22 William L. Shirer, 20th Century Journey: The Nightmare Years, 1930-1940, 
30 (1984). 
23 As illustrated by the cases discussed infra, the artwork at issue in these claims 
is fine art created by highly sought after artists, e.g. Vincent van Gogh, Gustav 
Klimt, Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, et al. Some of these artists were well-
known preceding the war (e.g. Rembrandt and other “Old Masters”), but some 
have only recently gained fame in the decades following the war (e.g. Egon 
Schiele). 
24 Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich 54-55 (1996).  
25 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Vol. I Ch. I, 
http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch01.html (describing 
Hitler’s youthful interest in painting and architecture, and his belief that he was 
destined to be a great artist)[http://perma.cc/MDE8-XXHB].    
26 Ralph Croizier, The Avant-Garde and the Democracy Movement: Reflections 
on Late Communism in the USSR and China, 51 Europe-Asia Studies 3, 483, 
485 (1999). 
27 Godfrey Baker, The unfinished art business of World War Two, BBC News 
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24812078 (citing 
Hitler’s opening speech to the Haus der Kunst “degenerate art” exhibition) 
[http://perma.cc/XUS6-PRJG]. 
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resented them, and the art world’s praises of their work that he 
deemed to be “degenerate” art.    
 
Masters of propaganda, the Nazis understood the power of 
both classical and degenerate art as visual tools to further the Nazi 
agenda in the eyes of the public.28  Per Nazi decree, all modern art 
was declared to be anti-German and required to be turned over to 
the state.29  Yet, Nazi leaders, such as Joseph Goebbels, were 
allowed to maintain their private collections of modern art.30  
Realizing that many of the leftist-leaning modern artists were using 
artistic expression as a form of political opposition to the Nazis, 
these works were confiscated and exhibited to the public in the die 
Haustellum Entartete Kunst, the Exhibition of Degenerate Art, held 
in late 1937.31  The Nazis concurrently held an exhibition of Nazi-
approved art to serve as a counter-balance to the exhibition of 
degenerate art.32  The purpose of the six-month exhibition was to 
 
28 Marc Balcells, Plundering Boys: A Cultural Criminology Assessment of the 
Power of Cultural Heritage as a Cause for Plunder in Armed Conflicts Along 
History, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property 
During Conflict 329, 347 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013) (describing 
the use of visual displays and military processions as propaganda to convince 
the German masses of total Nazi cultural dominance); Point 23 of The Program 
of the N.S.D.A.P. stated: “We demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary 
forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of 
organizations opposing the above made demands.” Document No. 1708-PS. 
Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P., 
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/25points.asp [http://perma.cc/W5NX-
7WK2]. 
29 Fernando Baez, A Universal History of the Destruction of Books: From 
Ancient Sumer to Modern-Day Iraq 211 (2008). The Reich Culture Chamber 
(Reichskulturkammer) was established in September of 1993 under the 
supervision of Joseph Goebbels to “stimulate the Aryanization of German 
culture and to prohibit, for example, surrealism, cubism, and Dadaism.” Id.  
30 Peter Adam, Art of the Third Reich 56 (1992); accord Jonathan Petropoulos, 
The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany 1-2 (2000).  
31 Lynn Nicholas, Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in The Third 
Reich and Second World War 18 (1995). 
32 Artworks from both of the Nazi exhibits (“degenerate” and Nazi-approved) 
were on exhibition side-by-side at the Neue Galerie Museum for German and 
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persuade the German people that modern art was “degenerate art 
unfit for the sophisticated German master race, which placed value 
on classical styles of order and symmetry.”33 
 
In 1940, Hitler created the Einsatzstab Reichsleither 
Rosenberg (“ERR”) for the sole purpose of confiscating and 
destroying art in Germany’s occupied territories.34 The Nazis 
plundered Germany and its occupied territories of art.35  Pillaging of 
cultural property, although forbidden by laws dating back to Roman 
times, was seen by the victor as a symbol of a successful conquest.36  
Not only was stolen art a symbol of the Nazis’ subjugation of the 
Jews and Slavs, much of it was valuable and easily transported, 
much like the jewelry and currency the Nazis also stole from the 
Jews after 1933.37  
 
The ultimate goal of the Nazis was the Aryanization of 
Germany’s culture, and all art was subject to “Germanic culture 
laws” that mandated the transfer of all property to German citizens 
from those individuals deemed by the Nazis not to be true German 
citizens, for reasons such as race, ethnicity, religion, or mental 
capacity.38  Coerced sales of artworks were used by the Nazis to 
 
Austrian Art in New York.  Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi 
Germany, 1937 (Mar. 13—Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.neuegalerie.org/content/degenerate-art-attack-modern-art-nazi-
germany-1937 [http://perma.cc/SQ2Q-URBA].  This was the most the most 
recent exhibition of “degenerate art” in the United States since the exhibition of 
“Degenerate Art”: Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany in 1991 at the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art. 
33 Nicholas, supra note 30.  
34 Marc Balcells, Plundering Boys: A Cultural Criminology Assessment of the 
Power of Cultural Heritage as a Cause for Plunder in Armed Conflicts Along 
History, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property 
During Conflict 329, 338 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013). 
35 See e.g. Nichols, supra note 30; accord Balcells, supra note 33.    
36 Balcells, supra note 33 at 340. 
37 Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution 202 (2003). 
38 Richard Grunberger, The 12 Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany 
1933-1945 424-25 (1971).   
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further their Aryanization of Germanic culture.39  The Nazis 
auctioned much of the confiscated degenerate art in Switzerland and 
elsewhere to purge Germany of art it deemed offensive, while 
simultaneously making a profit to fund the Third Reich’s 
operations.40   
 
Once the Allies became aware of the Nazi pillage and 
plunder of Europe’s cultural treasures, they issued the London 
Declaration, which memorialized their intent that anyone profiting 
from the spoils of this plunder, including neutral countries like 
Switzerland, would not go unpunished.41  The United States also 
created the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives agency, also 
known as the Monuments Men, who were tasked with protecting 
and reclaiming monuments and stolen works during the Allied 
advance.42  The Art Looting Investigation Unit also was tasked with 
recovering Nazi-looted art under the watch of the Office of Strategic 
Services.  Despite their successful efforts in recovering thousands of 
artworks looted by the Nazis, many artworks remain missing.43   
 
Still, some Allied soldiers stole art, and some of it made it 
back to the United States. The American government engaged in 
efforts to locate and return any stolen property found in the United 
States.  The Russian government, however, refused to return the 
 
39 Balcells, supra note 33 at 338. Germans utilized legal mechanisms of the 
Nazi-state to coerce sales from Jewish art dealers and others classified as having 
subservient legal rights. 
40 Baker, supra note 26 (citing Hitler’s opening speech to the Haus der Kunst 
“degenerate art” exhibition); Nicholas, supra note 30, at 4.  
41 Multilateral Declaration on Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy Controlled 
Territory (“London Declaration”), 3 Bevans 754 (1943), 1943 U.S.T. LEXIS 
188. 
42 Cheryl White & Thomas Livoti, Cultural Heritage Preservation: A Tool for 
Coin, in Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs: Protecting Cultural Property 
During Conflict 195, 202 (Joris Kila & James Zeidler eds., 2013).  
43 Stuart Eizenstat, The Unfinished Business of the Unfinished Business of World 
War II, in Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and Its Legacy 
297, 307 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2007).    
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train loads of art stolen by its soldiers, claiming that the art was 
compensation for the loss of human and cultural life in Eastern 
Europe as a result of Nazi war efforts. 
 
After the war, the Western European nations created special 
claims commissions so victims could attempt to reclaim their lost 
property.  But these commissions generally did not function well for 
a multitude of reasons.  First, most victims did not have evidence 
documenting property ownership because they were forced to flee 
in haste under life-threatening circumstances.  Second, the Nazi 
archives of stolen property were in disarray, destroyed, or still 
classified.  Third, the Nazis were not the only ones who stole before, 
during, and immediately following the war.  Fourth, the claim 
periods were too short. And, most importantly, many who worked 
in these commissions were just as anti-Semitic and biased against 
the victims of the Holocaust as were their Nazi predecessors.  
 
In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ronald 
Lauder explained that in the decades following the war, the trade in 
stolen art did not wane but rather was continued by museums, 
private collectors, and governments who were buying and selling art 
that they knew was stolen during the war.44 Mr. Lauder described 
this trade as the art world’s “dirty secret.”45 In her book, Rape of 
Europa, Lynn Nicholas described how American museums utilized 
middlemen in the art acquisition process.46  
 
Unlike other chattel, valuable fine art has been tracked by 
provenance records for centuries. The provenance of an artwork 
details the owners and sales.  Those who trade and work in the art 
world spend a great deal of money and time researching the 
 
44 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their 
Lost Heritage: Hearing on S. 2763 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 
Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and 
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 
114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement by Ronald S. Lauder).  
45 Id.  
46 Nicholas, supra note 30.  
10
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provenance of a financially valuable work of art to determine both 
its history and whether the current owner is the legitimate owner.  
Therefore, museums, galleries, and private collectors—even before 
the rise of the internet—should have been able to determine when 
they were in the possession of an expensive work that was stolen 
and sold during the period of Nazi power (1933-1945).  
 
B. The Legal Landscape Prior to the HEAR Act 
 
Due to the lack of information regarding the location of 
stolen art, biases against victims in the judicial system, differences 
in American and European legal systems, and legal technicalities, 
many survivors and their heirs have either chosen not to bring suit 
to recover their stolen property or have been unsuccessful in their 
efforts to seek restitution.   
 
In most American jurisdictions, a purchaser or donee cannot 
acquire title from a thief.47 Typically in these cases, a court will 
award title to the true owner if she sues.48 But if the claim is barred 
by statute of limitations, laches, or any other legal or equitable 
defense, the present possessor may succeed in keeping the property 
without having legal title.49 This prevents the rightful owner from 
pursuing recovery of the artwork through traditional remedies such 
as replevin or compensatory damages for conversion. The vast 
majority rule throughout state and federal courts in the United States 
is that a thief and any subsequent purchaser, including those who are 
innocent and acting in good faith, do not have title.50  
 
47 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140-141 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Menzel v. 
List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1966)).   
48 Id. at 141. 
49 Id.  
50 E.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 513-515 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J. 
dissenting). (“It is the general rule that ‘a bona fide purchaser of personal 
property taken tortiously or wrongfully, as by trespass or theft, does not acquire 
a title good against the true owner.’... [I]f the wrongdoer has no title, he or she 
cannot convey title; the purchaser acquires only that title reposing in the 
transferor….It follows from this well-established principle that, generally, as 
11
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New Jersey seems to be an anomaly.51 In New Jersey, title 
to stolen art work may transfer to the thief after expiration of the 
statute of limitations bars the claim. New Jersey also has rejected 
the common law rule that the statute of limitation begins anew with 
each subsequent transfer after the theft of personal property and 
instead has applied the majority rule for real property requiring 
tacking of the statute of limitations to transfers of personal 
property.52  This is a serious disadvantage to the rightful owner who 
may not realize the work is stolen or may not know of its current 
location and possessor while the clock continues to run.  Art, like 
most chattel, is easily concealable and can pass through many hands 
undetected, especially when traded on the black market.53  These 
types of transfers have created a major problem for Holocaust 
 
between the true owner who has lost personal property through theft and a 
subsequent good faith purchaser for value, the former is entitled to the goods 
over the latter. Title remains in the true owner rather than flowing to the bona 
fide purchaser when ‘the wrongdoer sells the chattel to [such] innocent 
purchaser . . . because the wrongdoer had [no title] to give.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
51 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 500-501 (N.J. 1980). 
52 Id. at 502-504; 510-511.  (Handler, J. dissenting). (“[The majority] rejects the 
doctrine that the acquisition of a stolen chattel, or a refusal to return it upon 
demand, itself constitutes a tortious conversion as against the true owner….The 
New York rule of subsequent conversions, rejected by the majority, is not a 
"statute of limitations," but rather is a substantive principle of the law of 
torts….It is clearly the predominant view that subsequent transfers of a stolen 
chattel constitute separate acts of conversion.”)(Internal citations omitted.)  Cf. 
Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n New York, a thief 
cannot pass good title….This means that… ‘absent other considerations an 
artwork stolen during World War II still belongs to the original owner, even if 
there have been several subsequent buyers and even if each of those buyers was 
completely unaware that she was buying stolen goods.’”)(internal citations 
omitted).    
53 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 496 (N.J. 1980) (“Open and visible 
possession of personal property, such as jewelry, may not be sufficient to put 
the original owner on actual or constructive notice of the identity of the 
possessor.  The problem is even more acute with works of art.  Like many kinds 
of personal property, works of art are readily moved and easily concealed.”) 
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survivors and their heirs in their attempts to recover Nazi-looted art.  
Nazi-looted art may have passed through many different hands 
without a trace (or with altered or fabricated provenance records) or 
be stored in a private collection for many decades before the true 
owner learns of its whereabouts.54  Even if a stolen work of art is 
held by a museum, it is not necessarily on view for the public and 
may be kept in storage.  Compounding this problem, provenance 
records may have been destroyed or altered to reflect a purchase 
history more favorable to one of the possessors post-theft.55    
 
Under the civil law system followed throughout Europe, a 
good faith purchaser may have title to stolen property after the 
passage of a certain period of time, or even immediately as may have 
been the law in Switzerland for some time.56  If the rightful owner 
succeeds in her claim to the property, then she must reimburse the 
good faith purchaser for the price he paid for the property.57  
Additionally, the loser pays all attorney’s fees and court costs under 
this system, and the filing fee to bring such suits is based on a 
 
54 See generally Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Heir did not know where the paintings were until she was contacted 
by a Dutch journalist); Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 
186 (2d Cir. 2019)(Painting held in private collection from 1941 until 1952 
when it was donated to museum. Museum’s errors in published provenance 
went undetected until 2011 after claim made by heir.); Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 
548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008)(Painting held in private family collection for over 
sixty-eight years until consigned for sale and heir was notified by Art Loss 
Register.).   
55 See Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 
2019)(error in published provenance went undetected until 2011); U.S. v. 
Portrait of Wally, 663 F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(altered provenance by 
owner); Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. App. 2019)(provenance 
altered by former gallery owner); Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 
2010)(provenance altered by former gallery owner). 
56 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010). The doctrine of 
prescription also may apply in Louisiana.  See Dunbar v. Seger- Thomschitz, 
615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (granting summary judgment to collector 
on prescription grounds without reaching merits). 
57 Id.  
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percentage of the value of the property. Thus, it is very difficult to 
bring suits for recovery of stolen art under this system ,because the 
financial burdens are immediate and may eventually the value of the 
recovered art.  If the claimant is successful, she has paid the filing 
fee, which could be substantial if the art has a high market value.  
She also must pay the good faith purchaser the price he paid for the 
work, which could be a significant number if the purchase was 
recent.  If the claimant loses, then she will be in a worse financial 
position than she was prior to filing suit.   
 
One of the earliest Nazi-looted art restitution cases in the 
United States involved a Chagall painting that was left behind when 
its Jewish owners, the Menzels, fled Belgium in 1940 after the Nazis 
invaded.58  Mrs. Menzel recognized the painting after seeing it in an 
art book in 1962 and demanded the owner return the painting.59  
When he refused, Mrs. Menzel filed a replevin action in New York 
state court and a jury returned a verdict in her favor.60  However, the 
jury also returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Mr. List, who 
had impleaded the Perls, the couple who sold him the painting.  The 
Perls were to reimburse Mr. List for the present value of the painting 
and the costs he incurred in defending the lawsuit.61  The case moved 
through the appellate courts in New York, and the state’s highest 
court held that the Perls owed Mr. List the full present value of the 
painting plus the interest that had incurred since the judgment in 
favor of Mrs. Menzel was entered.62   
In 2004, Maria Altmann’s case against the Republic of 
Austria brought national attention to the problem Holocaust victims 
and their heirs faced when suing a sovereign nation for restitution of 
stolen art in the United States.  Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Maria’s 
uncle, fled Austria following the Anschluss, leaving behind most of 
 
58 Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1966). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 94 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
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his possessions, including his art collection.63  The painting of his 
wife by Gustav Klimt, Adele Bloch-Bauer I, along with others in his 
collection, was stolen by the Nazis under the pretext that Ferdinand 
owed a large tax debt due to tax evasion.64 The painting ended up in 
the possession of the Osterreichishe Galerie Belvedere in Vienna.65     
Despite knowing that it was in possession of stolen goods, 
the Austrian government refused to return the painting to Ms. 
Altmann upon her request and attempted to claim title to the painting 
based on the terms of Adele Bloch-Bauer’s will.66  Due to the 
painting’s substantial value, Ms. Altman would have been required 
to pay a $350,000 filing fee, one third of its value, to bring her suit 
in Austria to recover the painting that was rightfully hers pursuant 
to her uncle’s will.67  Therefore, she chose to file her case in United 
States District Court in California where she only had to pay a $175 
filing fee.68  The Republic of Austria claimed it had sovereign 
immunity.69  However, Ms. Altmann argued that the provisions of 
the FSIA, enacted in 1976, were retroactive to 1945 and applied to 
this case.70 The United States Supreme Court ruled in her favor, 
finding that the FSIA’s provision that allowed a sovereign nation to 
be sued in the United States if it was acting in a commercial capacity 
was indeed retroactive and applied to the events that took place in 
1945.71   
 
63 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. As to the alleged bequest in Adele’s will, Maria Altmann said that her aunt 
would never have given Austria the paintings had she known what transpired 
during the Anschluss and thereafter.  See 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/music/howard-reich/ct-woman-
gold-reflections-20150404-column.html  
67 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684-685.  
68 Id.  
69 See Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
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The case of Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin illustrates a court 
blaming a victim for not doing enough to discover art allegedly sold 
under duress. In 2006, the Toledo Museum of Art filed suit against 
the heirs of Martha Nathan, a Holocaust survivor and prior owner of 
Paul Gauguin’s Street Scene in Tahiti.72 The painting was sold in a 
forced sale in Switzerland in 1938 along with other works owned by 
Ms. Nathan to gain safe passage to the United States for Ms. Nathan 
and her family members who were being held hostage.73  The 
museum sought to quiet title to the painting, and the heirs 
counterclaimed for conversion and restitution.74  The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the 
museum.75  The court concluded that the “the heirs knew [Nathan] 
was persecuted by the Nazis and sustained wartime losses,” and 
therefore should have made “further inquiries” because the Nazis’ 
thefts were public knowledge and Ms. Nathan herself had made 
prior claims as a victim of the Nazis’ theft.76  As a result, the court 
held that the statute of limitations had expired, thus barring the heirs’ 
claims for conversion and restitution.77   
When Ms. Nathan’s heirs sought return of Vincent Van 
Gogh’s The Diggers from the Detroit Institute of Art in 2007, the 
museum filed an action in federal court seeking declaratory 
judgment.78  This painting was also sold as part of the 1938 forced 
sale in Switzerland.79  The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan found that the conversion took place at 
the time of sale in 1938, and the Michigan statute of limitations to 
recover on a conversion claim expired three years later in 1941.80  
 
72 See Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F.Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
73 Id. at 803.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 807-808. 
77 Id.   
78 See Detroit Museum of Art v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at *3.   
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Unfortunately for Ms. Nathan’s heirs, the court believed the 
museum’s assertion that the 1938 sale in Switzerland was voluntary 
because it occurred after Ms. Nathan fled Germany for Paris but 
prior to the Nazi occupation of France.81 
The 2008 case of Vineberg v. Bissonnette offered a ray of 
hope to survivors and their heirs when a federal district court in 
Rhode Island held that laches was an insufficient defense to a claim 
of stolen art.82  Dr. Max Stern, a Jewish gallery owner in Dusseldorf, 
Germany, was forced by the Nazis to liquidate his gallery’s 
inventory, including a painting by Franz Xaver Winterhaler titled 
Girl from the Sabiner Mountains.83  The gallery’s inventory and Dr. 
Stern’s personal collection were consigned in 1937 to Lempertz 
Auction House, a Nazi-approved dealer, pursuant to a Reich 
Chamber order, and the art was auctioned within a few months of 
consignment for far less than market value.84  Dr. Stern fled 
Germany shortly thereafter and the Nazi government froze his 
assets, including the proceeds of the forced sale by Lempertz 
Auction House.85  After the war, Dr. Stern made numerous attempts, 
including advertisements and trips to Europe, to recover the stolen 
art.86  Unbeknownst to Dr. Stern, Dr. Karl Wilharm purchased the 
painting in 1937 from the Lempertz Auction House, and kept it in 
his private collection until his step-daughter, Baroness Maria-Louise 
 
81 Id. See also Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art 
Recovery Act of 2016, Chapman Law Review at 16 (2017) (“It is not widely 
known, however, that the Nazis often forced fleeing Jews to convey their 
property located in Switzerland back to the Reich, often in exchange for the 
promise of safe passage of other family members that were being held hostage.  
As a result, The Diggers is still on display as if Ms. Nathan had the ability to 
deal freely in commercial transactions while fleeing from a genocidal regime.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
82 See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008). 
83 See Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F.Supp.2d 300 (D.R.I. 2007). 
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Bissonnette took possession of it in 1959.87  Dr. Stern died in 1987 
and left the painting to his estate.88  Bissonnette brought the painting 
to Rhode Island in 1991, and in 2003, she consigned it with Estates 
Unlimited where it was scheduled to be auctioned in 2005.   
In 2004, the Stern Estate retained the Art Loss Register to 
assist in recovering Dr. Stern’s stolen art and listed the Winterhaler 
painting with the Germany’s Lost Art Internet Database.89  The Art 
Loss Register informed the Stern Estate of the auction, and the 
Estate filed a claim with New York’s Holocaust Claims Processing 
Office.90  The Holocaust Claims Processing Office demanded that 
Bissonnette return the painting to the Stern Estate.91  When she 
refused to return it and negotiations failed, Bissonnette shipped the 
painting back to Germany and filed an action in Germany’s courts 
to determine ownership.92  The Stern Estate filed suit in United 
States District Court in Rhode Island seeking replevin, or, in the 
alternative, damages.93   
The District Court granted the Stern Estate’s motion for 
summary judgment and ordered replevin of the painting to the 
Estate, rejecting Bissonnette’s laches defense due to Dr. Stern’s 
efforts to locate the painting and Bissonnette’s lack of evidence that 
she was prejudiced by the delay.94  Finding Dr. Stern’s efforts to 
locate the painting were reasonable, the Court noted that “[u]nder 
these circumstances, to require that Dr. Stern list every item lost in 
any attempt he made to locate the lost artwork would be 
unreasonable.  The ‘standard is not whether [Dr. Stern] did 
everything that might have been done with the benefit of hindsight, 
but whether [his] efforts were reasonable given the facts of the 
 
87 Id. at 303. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 304. 
90 Id.  
91 Id.   
92 Id.    
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
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case.’”95  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s ruling finding that Bissonnette did not 
meet the burden of proof of evidence-based prejudice required to 
support her laches defense.96  The First Circuit concluded: “A de 
facto confiscation of a work of art that arose out of a notorious 
exercise of man’s inhumanity to man now ends with the righting of 
that wrong through the mundane application of common law 
principles.  The mills of justice grind slowly, but they grind 
exceedingly fine.”97   
The Austrian government’s extortion of Holocaust victims 
seeking restitution of Holocaust-expropriated art came to light in 
2009 in U.S. v. Portrait of Wally.98  Portrait of Wally, a gouache by 
Egon Schiele, was subpoenaed in 1998 by the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York while it was on loan from the 
Leopold Museum in Austria for exhibition at the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York.99  In 1999, the U.S. government seized 
the painting pursuant to a warrant and filed a civil forfeiture action 
on the grounds that the painting was stolen property knowingly 
shipped into the country by the Leopold Museum in violation of the 
National Stolen Property Act.100  The painting’s rightful owner was 
Lea Bondi Jaray.101  Bondi was a Jewish gallery owner who fled 
Austria with her husband for England following the Anschluss.102  
Just prior to their escape, Friedrich Welz, a Nazi to whom Bondi 
was forced to sell her art gallery pursuant to Aryanization laws 
prohibiting Jews from owning businesses, demanded that Bondi 
give him Wally.103  Bondi initially refused, but ultimately relented 
 
95 Id. at 309 (citing Erisoty v. Rizik, No. Civ. A. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406 at 
*14 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (footnote omitted)). 
96 Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2008). 
97 Id. at 58-59. 
98 See U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F.Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
99 Id. at 237-238. 
100 Id. at 246. 
101 Id. at 238. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.   
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after her husband warned her that Welz may inhibit their escape.104 
After the war, Bondi was able to recover her gallery from Welz 
because it had been seized by U.S. troops, but Wally was returned to 
the Austrian National Gallery (“The Belvedere”) by mistake.105  
Bondi was unsuccessful in her attempts to convince The Belvedere 
to return the painting to her.106  When Dr. Rudolph Leopold, an 
Austrian collector, approached Bondi in 1953 to inquire about other 
Schiele works, she told him about Wally and he agreed to help her 
get the painting back.107  However, Leopold traded The Belvedere 
one of his Schiele works in exchange for Wally, and kept Wally in 
his private collection.108  After Bondi learned of Leopold’s scheme, 
she attempted to convince him through her lawyers to return the 
painting, but was unsuccessful.109  Dr. Leopold donated Wally along 
with the rest of his collection to the Leopold Museum in 1994.110   
During the pendency of the case, it was discovered that the 
Austrian government utilized a scheme requiring claimants seeking 
the return of expropriated artworks in Austria’s possession to make 
“donations” to the Austrian government in exchange for export 
permits for the artworks to be returned.111  After a protracted legal 
battle and an unfavorable ruling for the museum setting the case for 
trial, the Leopold Museum settled the case with Bondi’s heirs in 
2010 for $19 million in exchange for the painting.112  The U.S. 
Attorney’s Office issued a press release about the settlement, noting 
 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 240. 
106 Id. at 242.  The Belevedere was the same Austrian museum that refused to 
return the stolen Klimt paintings in its collection to Ms. Altmann, thus forcing 
her to take legal action. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, supra note   
107 Id. at 243.      
108 Id. at 243-244. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 245. 
111 See Kreder, supra note 80, at 11. 
112 See United States Attorney Southern District of New York Press Release, 
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that “the civil forfeiture action brought public attention to the 
struggle of victims of Nazi crimes to recover art and other property 
stolen by the Nazis.”113  As part of the settlement, the museum 
agreed that a plaque detailing its true provenance would always be 
displayed next to the painting.114  
While Wally was pending in New York, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided the case of Von Saher 
v. Norton Simon Museum of Art in 2009.115  Marei von Saher, heir 
of Dutch art dealer Jacques Goudstikker, filed suit against the 
Norton Simon Museum Art for return of two paintings by Lucas 
Cranach the Elder.116  Goudstikker fled the Netherlands with his 
family after the Nazi invasion, leaving behind his art collection 
which included the Cranach paintings and works by other well-
known artists such as Rembrandt and van Gogh.117  The Nazis 
confiscated the works, and Hermann Goering kept most of the 
collection, including the Cranach paintings, at his country estate 
until they were discovered by Allied Forces.118  The Goudstikker 
collection was returned to the Netherlands by the Allied Forces, but 
the Dutch government returned the Cranach paintings to another 
claimant instead of Goudstikker and this claimant sold them to the 
Norton Simon Museum.119  After von Saher filed her complaint, the 
museum filed a motion to dismiss that was granted by the United 
States District Court on the grounds that the California statute 
extending the statute of limitations was unconstitutional and von 
Saher’s complaint had not been filed within the three year statute of 
 
113 Id. at 3.  See also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, supra note   
114 See https://itsartlaw.org/2010/07/30/19-million-settlement-frees-portrait-of-
wally-after-13-year-of-legal-disputes/ 
115 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), 
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc by No. 07-56691, 592 F.3d 
954 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Von Saher I”). 
116 Id.  
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limitations required under the prior statute.120  Von Saher appealed 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the 
statute was unconstitutional due to the Federal Government’s field 
preemption in foreign affairs.121  The Supreme Court of the United 
States denied von Saher’s petition for certiorari.122 
As federal courts were ruling against survivors in this 
terrible history of cases, the United States maintained that its foreign 
policy with regard to Holocaust expropriated art was consistent with 
the Washington Principles. The State Department entered into the 
Terezin Declaration in 2009, which renewed and reaffirmed the 
principles agreed upon at the Washington Conference in 1998.123  
Despite this renewed commitment by the federal government to 
ensure that these claims were adjudicated on the merits and not 
decided on purely procedural defenses, unlawful owners continued 
to prevail in federal court.124   
Prior to the HEAR Act, the only Congressional legislation to 




122 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 
123 See The Holocaust Era Assets Conference Terezin Declaration 4, Holocaust 
Era Assets Conference (June 30, 2009), 
http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/program/conference-
proceedings/declarations/. 
124 See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (Laches defense 
successful in claim for Egon Schiele drawing even though current owner could 
not prove title. Issue of diligence in proving claims.) and Museum of Fine Arts 
of Boston v. Seiger-Thomschitz (2010) (“innocent transfer,” no bad faith, laches 
or unclean hands). See also Kreder, supra note 80, at 18 (“When a museum as 
esteemed as the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, asserts the statute of limitations, 
it renders the Washington Principles and Terezin Declaration all but 
meaningless. Other American museums have asserted the statute of limitations 
against claimants in court and/or sued survivors to shut down their inquiries on 
technical defenses like laches….They shut down any judicial inquiry into the 
merits of the survivors’ heirs [sic] claims. They undermine the credibility of the 
United States as a leader seeking justice for Holocaust victims and their heirs.”) 
(footnote omitted).   
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Commission Act of 1988 and the Holocaust Victims Redress Act.125 
This legislation was largely ineffective and is discussed infra.  
 
II. THE HEAR ACT 
 
A.  Legislative History 
 
Initially drafted in early 2016 as bipartisan-sponsored 
legislation, the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act was 
signed into law by President Barack Obama on December 16, 
2016.126  The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Von Saher was the impetus 
for the Act.127 In consideration of the bill, Congress looked at the 
history and effectiveness of prior efforts by the United States to 
ensure fair adjudication of Nazi-looted art claims, including the 
Washington Conference Principles, the Terezin Declaration, the 
standards adopted by the Alliance of American Museums, the 
Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the U.S. Holocaust Assets 
Commission Act of 1998.128    
 
 
125 See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186 
(1998)(“To establish a commission to examine issues pertaining to disposition 
of Holocaust-era assets in the United States before, during, and after World War 
II, and to make recommendations to the President on further action, and for 
other purposes.”) and Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158 
(1998)(“To provide redress for inadequate restitution of assets seized by the 
United States Government during World War II which belonged to victims of 
the Holocaust, and for other purposes.”). 
126 After President Obama signed HEAR into law, Ronald S. Lauder, chairman 
of the Commission for Art Recovery and the World Jewish Restitution 
Organization, stated: “The HEAR Act will end an enduring injustice for 
Holocaust victims and their families.  For too long, governments, museums, 
auction houses and unscrupulous collectors allowed this egregious theft of 
culture and heritage to continue, imposing legal barriers like arbitrary statutes of 
limitations to deny families prized possessions stolen from them by the Nazis.”  
https://web.archive.org/web/20180104140428/http://www.newsweek.com/obam
a-hear-act-law-holocaust-534793 
127 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016).   
128 Id.  
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After reviewing these prior efforts, Congress concluded that 
the “United States has not fulfilled its promise to ensure that claims 
to art lost in the Holocaust are resolved on their merits.”129  Reciting 
language from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Von Saher I, Congress 
noted that obstacles faced by these claimants include “procedural 
hurdles such as statute of limitations that prevent the merits of 
claims from being adjudicated.”130  Congress expressed concern that 
“State statutes of limitations can be an unfair impediment to the 
victims and their heirs, contrary to United States policy. Yet states 
have been unable to remedy this injustice because the regulation of 
war-related disputes is within the powers of the Federal 
Government.”131   
 
Based on its findings, Congress concluded that “a Federal 
limitations period, appropriately tailored to the unique 
circumstances of Holocaust-era claims, is therefore needed to 
guarantee that the United States fulfills the promises it has made to 
the world to facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-
confiscated and looted art and to make certain that claims to recover 
such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits 
of the claims.”132   
 
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary on April 7, 2016, and a hearing was conducted on June 7, 
2016, by the Subcommittees on the Constitution and Oversight, 
Agency Action, Federal Rights, and Federal Courts.133 During the 
hearing, the Committee heard testimony from various experts in the 
field of Holocaust expropriated art.134  In September 2016, the 
 
129 Id.  
130 Id. (footnote omitted). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted)(internal quotations omitted).  
133 Id. at 6. 
134Id. Dr. Agnes Peresztegi, the Executive Director for the Commission for Art 
Recovery Europe, testified that the “Committee should consider that the HEAR 
Act would not achieve its purpose of enabling claimants to come forward if it 
eliminates one type of procedural obstacle in order to replace it with another. To 
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Senate amended the bill to include language “favoring the resolution 
of disputed art claims without litigation and using alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms involving experts in art research.”135 
Additional amendments included specific descriptions of the types 
of art covered under the Act, a broadened knowledge standard for 
the trigger of the statute of limitations, broad coverage for all groups 
persecuted by the Nazis, an exception for claims previously barred, 
and a sunset date.136  The Senate also removed the definition of 
“unlawfully lost,” which the House of Representatives defined as 
“theft, seizure, forced sale, sale under duress, or any other loss of an 
artwork or cultural property that would not have occurred absent 
persecution during the Nazi era.”137  The most significant 
amendment, however, was the removal of the bar on the availability 
of equitable defenses, including the doctrine of laches, to those 
defending against these claims.138   
 
cite some concerns: narrowing the definition of looted art, shifting the burden of 
proof unnecessarily in some instances to the claimant; and generally adding or 
confirming other procedural obstacles. Cases related to Holocaust looted art 
should only be adjudicated on the merits.”  Holocaust Expropriated Art 
Recovery Act: Hearing on S. 2763 Before the S. Comm. on the Constitution, 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 
114th Cong. 1 (2016)(testimony of Agnes Peresztegi).  Unfortunately, the 
Senate amended the bill to remove the language precluding the use of laches, 
which is precisely what Dr. Peresztegi advised against. See S. Rep. No. 114-
394, at 7 (2016).   
135  Id. at 6.   
136  Id. at 7.  
137 Id. By including equitable defenses and laches and removing the definition 
of “unlawfully lost,” this amendment appears to contradict the stated purpose of 
this Act to ensure that these claims “are resolved in a just and fair manner” in 
accordance with U.S. foreign policy.  This is outside the scope of this article, 
but this issue has been addressed in other scholarly articles.  See generally 
Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 
2016, 20 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2017); and Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning 
Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. L. Rev. 363 (2019).   
138 Id. Prior to the amendments, Section 5(a) of Senate bill originally read: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any provision of State 
law, or any defense at law or equity relating to the passage of time (including 
25
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B.  The Provisions 
 
i. Congressional Findings 
 
As a result of its investigation, Congress determined that 
“Federal legislation is needed because the only court that has 
considered the question held that the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
States from making exceptions to their statutes of limitations to 
accommodate claims involving the recovery of Nazi-confiscated 
art.”139  Thus, the Act “expresses [Congress’] sense that the private 
resolution of claims by parties involved, on the merits and through 
the use of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation panels 
established for this purpose with the aid of experts in provenance 
research and history, will yield just and fair resolutions in a more 




The stated purpose of the HEAR Act is twofold:  
 
“(i) [F]irst, to ensure that laws governing claims art and cultural 
property confiscated by the Nazis further United Policy as expressed 
in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, 
the Holocaust Victims Redress Act and the Terezin Declaration; (ii) 
second, to ensure that claims are not unfairly barred by statutes of 
limitations and are resolved in a just and fair manner.”141  This 
section clearly establishes the intent of Congress to regulate in the 
area of Holocaust-expropriated art, due to the “unique 
 
the doctrine of laches)….”  S. 2763, 114th Cong. 2D § 5(a) (April 7, 2016).  
139 HEAR   
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
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circumstances” of these claims stemming directly from the horrific 




The Act defines actual discovery as “knowledge,” which, in 
turn, is defined as “having actual knowledge of a fact or 
circumstance or sufficient information with regard to a relevant fact 
or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof.”143  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee clarified that “for the purposes of the 
limitations period established in Section 5(a), this is intended to 
require more than access to the information with regard to relevant 
facts and circumstances. The party must have the knowledge itself 
or have sufficient information to constitute actual knowledge.”144  
This is a significant change as many state statutes only require 
constructive knowledge, which can be imputed to a victim’s heir.145  
Neither constructive nor imputed knowledge are included in the 
HEAR Act. 
 
Art covered under the Act includes fine art, graphic art, 
applied art, books, music, photographs, cinematographic archives 
and mediums, sacred and ceremonial objects, and Judaica stolen or 
lost during the covered period.146  The period for losses covered 
under the Act is from the rise of the Nazis in January 1, 1933 through 
 
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id.   
145 See Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and 
Uncertainties of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 
Colum. J.L. & Arts 157, 163 (2019) (“Many states have limitations periods that 
run from when the original owner knew or should have known (that is, had 
constructive knowledge) of the whereabouts of the stolen property.  Even in 
those states where the statute of limitations begins upon “knowledge” of the 
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the end of World War II in December 31, 1945.147  The limitations 
period applies to any group who was persecuted by the Nazis, their 
allies, agents, or associates and lost art as a result of this persecution 
during the covered period.148 The Senate report noted that Nazi 
persecution was not carried out by the Nazis alone, but also the 
German government, Germany’s allies, and “private agents and 
others.”149  Congress has clearly recognized that there are many 
groups who were persecuted by the Nazis and their co-conspirators.  
It also has recognized that these co-conspirators were not members 
of the Nazi party, but nevertheless assisted the Nazis in furtherance 
of their “Final Solution.”  
iv. Federal Statute of Limitations 
 
Section 5 is the key provision of the Act setting forth the 
applicable Federal statute of limitations for Holocaust expropriated 
art claims.  Subsection (a) defines the statute of limitations period:    
(a) In general— 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or 
State law or any defense at law relating to the 
passage of time, and except as otherwise provided 
in this section, a civil claim or cause of action 
against a defendant to recover any artwork or other 
property that was lost during the covered period 
because of Nazi persecution may be commenced 
not later than 6 years after the actual discovery by 
the claimant or the agent of the claimant of— 
(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other 
property; and 
(2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork 
or other property.150 
 
147 HEAR  
148 HEAR 
149 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 9 (2016).   
150 HEAR 
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The statute of limitations under the Act is six years after the 
actual discovery by the claimant or the claimant’s agents or heirs.  
The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that “the purpose of this 
section is to open courts to claimants to bring covered claims and 
have them resolved on the merits, consistent with the Terezin 
Declaration.  While defenses at law are not merely procedural, the 
special circumstances created by the Nazi persecution necessitate an 
opportunity for their temporary waiver.”151  Section 5 applies to 
claims pending on the date of enactment and those filed from the 
period of the date of enactment through December 31, 2026.152 
 
v. Limitations on the HEAR Act 
 
Subsection (b) addresses issues with misidentification and 
clarifies that the statute of limitations only begins to run on the date 
actual knowledge occurs, i.e. when the claimant has sufficient facts 
to establish that the work is the one that was stolen during the 
covered period.153 
 
Pursuant to subsection (c), a claim is deemed actually 
discovered on the date of enactment under the following 
circumstances: 
 
(1) before the date of enactment of this Act— 
(A)  a claimant had knowledge of the elements set 
forth in subsection (a); and 
(B) the civil claim or cause of action was barred by 
a Federal or State statute of limitations; or 
 
(2)(A) before the date of enactment of this Act, a 
claimant had knowledge of the elements set forth in 
subsection (a); and 
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(B) on the date of enactment of this Act, the civil 
claim or cause of action was not barred by a Federal 
or State statute of limitations.154 
 
This subsection allows “claimants to resuscitate claims that may 
have been barred in the past,” but does not affect claims that have 
already been adjudicated to final judgment “from which no appeal 
lies on the date of enactment.”155 The statute of limitations period 
also applies to those claims that are known on the date of enactment, 
but not yet barred.156 
 
The HEAR Act limitations period does not pertain to claims 
barred by a Federal or State statute of limitation on the day before 
the enactment if the claimant had the requisite knowledge required 
under subsection (a) on or after January 1, 1999 and “not less than 
6 years have passed” since the claimant obtained the requisite 
knowledge and during that time, the claim was not barred by a 
statute of limitations.157  In other words, a claimant who had 
knowledge of a claim on or after January 1, 1999 cannot bring a 
claim under the HEAR act limitation period if 6 or more years have 
passed since she obtained the requisite knowledge.  But, this 
exception does not “[bar] the claimant from asserting claims that 
remain timely under applicable State law.”158  Congress included 
this exception because it “recognizes the importance of quieting title 
in property generally and the importance that claimants assert their 
rights in a timely fashion.”159  The Senate Judiciary Committee 
explained how this exception should operate:   
 
“The six year period in subsection 5(e) reflects that 
in subsection 5(a), but it is not intended to extend 
 
154 HEAR  
155 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).   
156 Id.  
157 HEAR 
158 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 10 (2016).   
159 Id.  
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shorter limitations periods that came and went prior 
to the enactment of the HEAR Act.  For instance, if 
the relevant conditions are met and the claim arose 
after 1999; the applicable limitations period was 
three years; and three years elapsed before the HEAR 
Act was enacted, the claim would fall under the 5(e) 
exception. The claimant must have had, however, an 
opportunity to bring a claim that was not time-barred 
during that six year period.”160  
 
While the language of this exception is somewhat confusing, 
it appears that the purpose of this subsection is to encourage 
claimants to bring their claims in a timely manner.  The exception is 
similar to a laches defense but not exactly the same.  The exception 
requires a demonstration by the one asserting the defense that the 
claimant had the “opportunity” within the requisite six year period 
to bring a claim that would not have been ruled time-barred. 
Seemingly, this “opportunity” depends upon the applicable statute 
of limitations as interpreted by the courts through the date the claim 
arose, which varies from state to state.161 In any event, as 
demonstrated above, the cases were being decided against survivors 
 
160 Id. at 11. 
161 See generally Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the HEAR Act of 
2016, 42 Colum. J.L. & Arts 157 (2019) (discussing interpretative issues with 
HEAR Act); Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act 
of 2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution 
Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (discussing implication that HEAR Act 
interferes with states’ traditional domain over statute of limitations in regard to 
property rights); Jennifer A. Kreder,  Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated 
Art Recovery Act of 2016, 20 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2017) (arguing the HEAR Act 
eliminates the complex choice of law problem faced by courts as well as the 
laches defense); and Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art 
Recovery Art of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U. 
Ill. Rev. 363 (2019) (arguing the extension of statute of limitations in the HEAR 
Act does not go far enough and recommending further action such as extending 
sunset of the HEAR Act).    
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at every step of the way since Altmann came down in the Supreme 
Court in 2004. 
 
The Act concludes with an express statement that it does not 
create any claim or new Federal or state cause of action.162  All 
claims must be filed before the sunset of the Act on January 1, 
2027.163 
 
vi. Construction of the HEAR Act 
 
The language used by Congress in the operative provision of 
Section 5 (a) establishing the uniform statute of limitations is 
permissive: “a civil claim…may be commenced not later than 6 
years….[emphasis added]”164  Mandatory language (“shall”) 
appears only in the text of subsections (b) through (f) in Section 5. 
As discussed supra, these later subsections set forth the limitations 
on the Act: possible misidentification, pre-existing claims, 
exceptions, applicability, and the sunset date. Thus, mandatory 
language would be necessary to define the limitations set forth in 
these sections.  Presumably, Congress chose to utilize permissive 
language in Section 5 (a) because there is a wide variance of time 
periods allowed under existing state statutes of limitations165 and the 




164 HEAR.  See also Frankel and Sharoni, supra note 159, at 174. (“courts 
should construe the ambiguity of ‘may be commenced’ to allow claims to be 
brought that remain timely under applicable state statutes of limitations, such as 
under New York’s demand and refusal rule.”).    
165 See also Frankel and Sharoni, supra note 159. 
166 Although it is outside the scope of this article, retroactive application is 
acceptable and clear, see e.g., Altmann.  See Emily J. Cunningham, Justice on 
the Merits: An Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 
2016, 69 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 427, ___ (2018) (“Procedural changes might be 
impermissibly retroactive if they create a new cause of action based on old 
conduct. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, the Supreme 
Court found that Congress could not create a cause of action against conduct 
occurring before a statute’s enactment where no cause of action previously 
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Act does not command the States to take any action in regard to their 
statute of limitations, but rather extends the window of opportunity 
to assert claims thereby opening the courts to victims and their heirs.   
 
C.  The Legal Landscape Since the Enactment of the HEAR Act 
 
Since the enactment of HEAR, the New York Supreme 
Court Appellate Division and the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit have 
considered the HEAR Act.  Two recent cases illustrate the divergent 
outcomes.  
 
In June 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court 
dismissing Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art.167  
 
existed.  The case addressed whether private parties could sue on behalf of the 
United States for pre-1986 conduct under a 1986 amendment to the False 
Claims Act, which previously barred the claims at issue in the case. While 
Congress couched the amendment’s language in jurisdictional terms, the 
Supreme Court applied the presumption against retroactivity to bar its 
application to pre-1986 conduct.  The Court refined its statement in Landgraf 
that jurisdictional statutes speaking to the “power of the court” to hear a case are 
not retroactive by distinguishing between situations that qualify as an exception 
to the general presumption and a separate exception altogether. Jurisdictional 
statutes that “create [] jurisdiction where none previously existed” concern 
parties' substantive rights and hence are subject to the presumption against 
retroactivity.  A court might interpret HEAR to present a new cause of action. 
Instead of transferring jurisdiction from one court to another, HEAR restores 
opportunities previously barred. While technically HEAR does not create a 
cause of action and was not intended to do so, like Hughes Aircraft's 
amendment, HEAR arguably creates jurisdiction that did not exist prior to its 
enactment. However, HEAR does not create a cause of action because the 
underlying offense of conversion applied at the time of the thefts; instead, 
HEAR restores a claimant's procedural opportunity to present its cause of action 
before a court. Under Hughes Aircraft, if HEAR creates a cause of action, 
HEAR is subject to the presumption of retroactivity, which Congress may 
overcome through express language.).   
167 See Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 
2019).   
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Laurel Zuckerman, the great-grandniece of Paul and Alice 
Leffmann and heir to their estate, sought replevin of Pablo Picasso’s 
The Actor, a painting owned by the Leffmanns until they were 
forced to sell it to escape Nazi-occupied Europe in 1938.168  The 
Leffmanns were wealthy Jewish industrialists who fled Nazi 
Germany in 1937 for Italy only to discover that Italy was just as 
dangerous.169  After being stripped of their assets by the Nazis 
pursuant to the Nuremburg Laws, the Leffmanns had to pay an 
enormous flight tax on their flight from Germany.170  Before fleeing 
to Italy, the Leffmanns sent The Actor to storage in Switzerland.171  
Desperate for cash to flee Italy, the Leffmanns sold The Actor to 
Käte Perls and Paul Rosenberg, Paris art dealers, for $12,000 in 
1938 after turning down another offer for the same amount.172  The 
Leffmanns needed the money to fund their escape through 
Switzerland and on to Brazil, which would require payment of both 
substantial taxes and bribes to ensure their safety.173  After the war 
ended, the Leffmanns were successful in some of their claims for 
property looted by the Nazis before they fled Germany, but they did 
not seek return of The Actor.174  In 1939, the painting was insured 
for $18,000 by Rosenberg.175 Then, just three years after the 
Leffmanns sold it, Chrysler heiress and art collector Thelma 
Chrysler Foy purchased the painting from a New York gallery for 
$22,500.176  Foy donated the painting to The Metropolitan Museum 
of Art in 1952.177  
 
 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc, Case no. 18-634 Doc. 173 at 30 (July 10, 
2019).  
171 Zuckerman, 928 F.3d.  
172 Id. at 191.   
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 191-192. 
175 Id. at 192. 
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
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In accordance with New York’s demand and refusal rule, 
Ms. Zuckerman made a demand for the return of the painting in 
2010, but The Met refused to return it.178  Zuckerman then filed suit 
alleging conversion and seeking replevin due to duress based on the 
Leffmanns’ forced sale of the painting in 1938 to fund their escape 
from the growing Nazi threat in Europe.179  The District Court 
dismissed her claims on the defendant’s motion to dismiss finding 
“failure to allege duress under New York law.”180  Zuckerman 
appealed to the Second Circuit, but in its de novo review, the court 
focused on the defendant museum’s defense of laches not addressed 
by the District Court.181  Finding unreasonable delay by Zuckerman 
and prejudice to the museum, the court affirmed the judgment of the 
lower court.182  The Second Circuit based its determination of 
unreasonable delay on the fact that over seventy years had passed 
between the sale of the painting and Zuckerman’s demand with no 
prior attempts to recover the painting made by the Leffmanns or 
anyone acting on their behalf.183  Further, the Second Circuit 
deemed the Leffmanns to be a “financially sophisticated couple” 
because they successfully recovered other Nazi-looted property 
after the war, and thus determined it was highly implausible that 
they or their heirs had not sought return of the painting earlier.184  
Rejecting Zuckerman’s claim that the painting was sold under 
duress during the period of Nazi power, the court noted that “[t]his 
is not a case where the identity of the buyer was unknown to the 
seller or the lost property was difficult to locate.  Indeed, the 
Painting was a “masterwork” of Picasso, not an obscure piece of art.  
Nor is this a case where the plaintiff alleges that the buyers 
themselves exerted any undue or improper pressure on the seller.”185  
 
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc, Case 18-634 Doc. 173 at 2 (July 10, 2019).   
182 Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d at 193-195. 
183 Id. at 193-194. 
184 Id. at 194.   
185 Id.  
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The court also held that The Met was prejudiced due to Zuckerman’s 
delay, but pointed to no specific evidence of prejudice other than the 
delay was unreasonable since the painting had been in the museum’s 
collection since 1952.186 
 
Most surprisingly, the Second Circuit held that the Supreme 
Court precedents of Petrella and SCA Hygiene did not apply to the 
HEAR Act, because the text of the HEAR Act only prohibits 
defenses at law and “allowing defendants to assert a laches 
defense…comports with the legislative scheme advanced by the 
HEAR Act.”187  The court noted that “[u]nlike a mechanical 
application of a statute of limitations, a laches defense requires a 
careful analysis of the respective positions of the parties in search of 
a just and fair solution.”188  But, in its search for this “just and fair 
solution,” the court focused solely on the plaintiff’s delay in 
bringing her claim and overlooked evidence of the museum’s 
unclean hands.189  After being denied rehearing en banc, Zuckerman 
 
186 Id. at 190. The Met was gifted the painting so there were no expenditures for 
purchase, only costs for insurance and maintenance from 1952 to the present.  It 
is possible the painting may have lost some value in 2010 when a visitor tripped 
and fell into it causing an almost six inch tear.  The museum repaired the 
painting in-house. See 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/arts/design/21picasso.html 
187 Id. at 196. The Second Circuit relied heavily upon Frankel and Sharoni’s 
article in its analysis of HEAR, quoting their interpretation that Congress’ 
removal of language precluding the laches defense from the final bill “may be 
presumed that the limitation was not intended.”  Zuckerman, 928 F.3d at 197 
(internal citations omitted).     
188 Id.  
189 Id. See generally Zuckerman Pet. Rehrg. En Banc Case 18-634 Doc. 173 at 2 
(July 10, 2019) (museum’s published provenance showing Leffmann did not 
own the painting at the time of the sale in 1938 was “manifestly erroneous for 
45 years” and was not corrected until Zuckerman made inquiries in 2011).  It is 
important to note here that The Met had several former Monuments Men, 
including Capt. James Joseph Rorimer, on staff when the museum received the 
painting.  At the time of Foy’s gift in 1952, Capt. Rorimer was the Director of 
the Cloisters for the museum.  He later became Director of The Met in 1955, a 
position he remained in until his death in 1966.  As a former Monuments Man 
and an art historian, Capt. Rorimer certainly knew the importance of keeping 
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filed her petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court on January 24, 2020.190 
 
Less than two weeks after the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Zuckerman, New York’s highest state court held that the laches 
defense did not bar the plaintiff’s claims of replevin and conversion 
and affirmed the lower court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in 
Reif v. Nagy.191  Timothy Reif and David Frankel, heirs of Jewish 
art collector and Holocaust victim Fritz Grunbaum,192 filed a lawsuit 
alleging conversion and replevin in New York state court in 2016 
against Richard Nagy and his gallery, seeking the return of two 
works by Egon Schiele stolen from Grunbaum by the Nazis in 
1938.193  The Nazis used a power of attorney signed by Grunbaum 
 
accurate provenance records, possessed specialized knowledge and training in 
U.S. foreign policy regarding Nazi-looted art, and had first-hand experience 
returning Nazi-looted art to its rightful owners.  See 
https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/rorimer-capt-james-j  and 
https://www.metmuseum.org/blogs/now-at-the-met/2014/in-the-footsteps-of-
the-monuments-men.      
190 The questions presented in Zuckerman’s petition for writ of certiorari are: “1. 
Whether the nonstatutory defense of laches may bar an action to recover 
artwork lost because of Nazi persecution, where that action has been brought 
within the statute of limitations prescribed by Congress in the Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016? 2. Whether an action may be 
dismissed for laches at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage without discovery or exploration 
of factual disputes about the laches defense?”  Zuckerman Pet. Cert. at i 
(January 24, 2020).  
191 Reif v. Nagy, 175 A.D.3d 107, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).  
192 Fritz Grunbaum was a Jewish cabaret star and well-known art collector who 
was arrested by the Nazis while attempting to escape Austria in the weeks 
following the Anschluss.  He was imprisoned at the Buchenwald and Dachau 
concentration camps, where he was murdered in 1941.  While Grunbaum was 
imprisoned, the Nazis inventoried the couple’s property, appointed an Aryan 
trustee to oversee their assets (and to whom Elisabeth was required to pay a 
substantial fee), and evicted Elisabeth from her apartment.  Elisabeth survived 
Fritz, but was murdered in a Nazi death camp in 1942.  Elisabeth’s sister, 
Mathilde Lukacses, escaped Austria with her husband and survived the war.  
See Reif, 175 A.D.3d at 109-112.  
193 Reif and Frankel are the legal heirs of the claimants in Bakalar v. Vavra. An 
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while he was imprisoned at Dachau to force his wife Elisabeth to 
allow inventory of Grunbaum’s prolific art collection which 
included 81 works by Schiele and other well-known artists such as 
Rodin, Rembrandt, and Degas.194  The Nazis valued the collection 
to be worth 5791 Reichsmarks and seized it under the Reich’s laws 
declaring Jewish assets to be property of the state.195  When Nagy 
acquired the paintings in 2011 and 2013, he was aware that there 
were issues with the provenance of the works, including that the 
Grunbaum heirs made a claim to at least one of the paintings.196  
 
Nagy and his gallery, through their experts, argued that 
Elisabeth’s sister, Mathilde Lukacses, was the owner based on the 
provenance, most likely through an intervivos gift made by one of 
the Grunbaums.197  The court rejected this argument as speculative 
given the evidence that the provenance was altered by a former 
gallery owner and the paintings never left Austria.198  Finding prima 
facie evidence that the paintings were never in the possession of 
Mathilde, the court determined that the paintings belonged to the 
Grunbaums.199  In response to the defendants’ bold assertion that 
Grunbaum’s power of attorney was voluntary, the court stated that 
“[w]e reject the notion that a person who signs a power of attorney 
in a death camp can be said to have executed the document 
voluntarily.”200  Thus, the court held that all subsequent transfers of 
 
Austrian court declared in 2002 that Vavra (Fritz’s heir) and Fischer 
(Elisabeth’s heir) were the legal heirs to Grunbaum’s estate. See Reif, 175 
A.D.3d at 113-114.  In that Bakalar, Vavra and Fischer sought return of another 
Schiele work in Grunbaum’s collection, Seated Woman with a Bent Leg, but the 
Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal on the basis of laches.  
See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d. Cir. 2010).       
194 Reif, 175 A.D.3d at 110. 
195 Id.   
196 Id. at 118.  
197 Id. at 129. One of the defense experts, Lillie, admitted there was no evidence 
of such a gift to Mathilde. Id. at 122, note 24.  
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 126-127.   
200 Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted).  
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the artworks were invalid because Grunbaum had executed his 
power of attorney under duress.201   
 
The court also rejected the defendants’ laches defense, 
because there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendants.202 
Specifically, the court determined that there was “no change in 
position” since the defendants purchased the paintings in 2013; the 
defendants had notice of the Grunbaum heirs’ claims before the 
paintings were purchased; the defendants purchased the paintings at 
a discount; and the defendants bought title insurance to protect 
against challenges.203  Concluding its opinion, the court noted that 
the HEAR Act and New York’s public policy to prevent art theft 
informed its findings.204  The court was careful to note that it was 
not making “a declaration…that plaintiffs established the estate’s 
absolute title,” but that it was “adjudicating the parties’ respective 
superior ownership and possessory interests. We find that plaintiffs 
have met their burden of proving superior title to the Artworks.  
Defendants raise no triable issue of fact.”205 
 
In sum, the Second Circuit found the HEAR Act did not 
apply in Zuckerman and affirmed dismissal based on evidence of 
laches, while the New York state court relied on the evidence of 
duress and the purpose of the HEAR Act to inform its findings and 
rejection of the defendants’ laches defense.  Thus, the New York 
state court decided Reif solely on the merits as the HEAR Act 
recommends, while the Second Circuit rejected the HEAR Act and 
dismissed Zuckerman due to a procedural defense with no 
consideration of the merits of Zuckerman’s claim.  
 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
 
201 Id. at 129.   
202 Id. at 130-131. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 131-132. 
205 Id. at 132. 
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In Von Saher I, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s 
statute extending the statute of limitations for claims of Holocaust-
expropriated art was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the 
Federal Government’s exclusive foreign affairs powers.206  
Congress passed the HEAR Act to remedy the effect of the ruling in 
Von Saher.207  Although other scholarly articles have questioned the 
constitutionality of the HEAR Act,208 Congress was vested with the 
constitutional authority to pass legislation in response to the ruling 
in Von Saher I.  The U.S. Constitution clearly and unambiguously 
provides authority to both Congress and the Executive branch for 
the enactment of the HEAR Act, and United States Supreme Court 
precedent supports this authority.  
 
A.  Article I and Article II-Foreign Affairs and War Powers, the 
Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution vests the 
Congress with multiple powers, including regulation of interstate 
and foreign commerce, war powers, and “to make any laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing powers….”209  Article II vests in the Executive branch 
foreign affairs power to make treaties with foreign nations with the 
concurrence of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors to foreign 
 
206 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
207 See S. Rep. supra note 125.  
208 See William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural Preemption 
Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 Pepp. L. Rev. 19 (2018) (HEAR 
preempts state property laws on a purely procedural basis and therefore violates 
the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the principles of 
federalism); Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 
2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution 
Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (2018) (HEAR act violates the Tenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); and Herbert L. Lazerow, Holocaust Art 
Disputes: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 Int’l Law 
195 (2018) (application of HEAR Act would be an unconstitutional taking 
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in cases where state statute 
of limitations has expired before enactment of HEAR). 
209 U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8. 
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nations, and to receive foreign heads of state.210  The Constitution 
explicitly states that “no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation [and] no State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress…enter into any agreement or Compact with another State, 
or with a foreign Power, or engage in War….”211  Thus, Articles I 
and II vest in both the Congress and the Executive branch the 
exclusive authority over war and foreign affairs powers, and Article 
I also vests in Congress the power to regulate interstate and 
international commerce.  
 
i. War and Foreign Affairs Powers 
 
The war and foreign affairs powers are the most obvious 
Constitutional authority supporting the HEAR Act.212  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee noted in its summary report on the HEAR Act 
that the “states have been unable to remedy this injustice [of 
Holocaust-expropriated art] because the regulation of war-related 
disputes is within the powers of the Federal Government.”213  To 
support this conclusion, the Senate Judiciary Committee referenced 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi where the Court held that foreign policy is the exclusive 
purview of the federal government.214  In Garamendi, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of California, 
finding that the state’s Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act 
“(“HVIRA”) was unconstitutional because it interfered with the 
Federal Government’s foreign affairs powers, specifically the 
President’s foreign policy powers.215  Not surprisingly, the Ninth 
 
210 U.S. Constit. Art. II, § 2 and 3. 
211 U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 10. 
212 See U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8 and Art. II, § 2 and 3. 
213 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016).   
214 See S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5-6, note 24 (2016) (citing Amer. Insur. Assoc. v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (“Vindicating victims injured by acts and 
omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within the traditional 
subject matter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are 
overriding, and which the National Government has addressed.”). 
215 See generally Amer. Insur. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).   
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Circuit relied heavily upon Garamendi in support of its decision in 
Von Saher.216  
 
But, Garamendi is not the only Supreme Court precedent 
that supports the Federal Government’s foreign affairs and war 
powers.  In 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act 
which capped rents for housing in “defense rental” areas.217  
Landlords challenged the constitutionality of the Act on several 
grounds, including due process and delegation of power to the 
Administrator of Office of Price Administration, in the case of 
Bowles v. Willingham.218  The Supreme Court held that while 
Congress’ war powers were not unlimited,219 Congress was well 
within its authority in this instance because it had “done all that due 
process under the war emergency requires.”220  The Court frequently 
referenced Congress’ war powers throughout its opinion and made 
a particularly cogent statement:   
 
We need not determine what constitutional limits there are to price-
fixing legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions 
created by activities resulting from a great war effort.  A nation 
which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging of 
that war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system 
of price control on the domestic front which will assure each 
landlord a 'fair return' on his property.221  
 
In the wake of the war, Congress passed the Housing and 
Rent Act in 1947 to control rising rents and prevent a housing 
shortage due to returning servicemen.222  The constitutionality of 
 
216 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
217 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. no. 77-421 (1942).  
218 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). 
219 Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 
(1934), ('even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations 
safeguarding essential liberties.')). 
220 Id. at 521. 
221 Id. at 519 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
222 Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Pub. L. no. 31 (1947).   
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Congress’ action was challenged yet again by a landlord in Woods 
v. Cloyd-Miller.223  The Supreme Court held in Woods that Congress 
could use its war powers after a war had ended to remedy the effects 
of the war.224 The legislative history of the Act revealed that 
Congress invoked its war powers to remedy a situation “of which 
the war was a direct and immediate cause.”225  The Court relied 
heavily on its precedent in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, where 
it previously held “that the war power includes the power to remedy 
the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress and continues 
for the duration of that emergency.”226  More importantly, the Court 
noted in Woods that “the war power does not necessarily end with 
the cessation of hostilities.”227 Finally, the Court was careful to point 
out that the line of war powers cases follows its precedent in Stewart 
v. Kahn, “which held that Congress had the power to toll the statute 
of limitations of the States during the period when the process of 
their courts was not available to litigants due to the conditions 
obtaining in the Civil War.”228  
 
The case of Missouri v. Holland involved a constitutional 
challenge to Congress’ power to pass laws to effectuate treaties.229  
The Supreme Court held that the treaty power and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause conferred upon Congress the authority to pass 
legislation to effectuate a treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain to protect migratory birds.230 According to the Court, 
Congress had this authority as long as the treaty was valid and did 
not infringe upon the Constitution.231 Justice Holmes noted that 
“[n]o doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the 
 
223 Woods v. Cloyd-Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948).  
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 144.   
226 Id. (citing Hamilton v. KY, 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919)(internal quotations 
omitted)).   
227 Id. at 141. 
228 Id. at 142 (citing Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493 (1870)). 
229 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).  
230 Id.  
231 Id.  
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control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.”232  The 
Court held that “a national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude…can be protected only by a national action in concert 
with that of another power” and “it is not sufficient to rely upon the 
States,” reasoning that there may not be any birds left to protect 
without Congressional action to uphold the treaty.233   
 
Upholding the Roosevelt-Litivinov Agreement234 as 
supreme over state law, the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v. Belmont 
that the “external powers of the United States are to be exercised 
without regard to state laws or policies.”235  The Court held that this 
rule applies not only to treaties requiring concurrence of the Senate 
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, but to “all international compacts 
and agreements from the very fact that complete power over 
international affairs is in the national government, and is not and 
cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of 
the several states.”236  The case involved a property dispute over 
funds transferred to a U.S. bank from a Russian company prior to 
the Russian Revolution, which were assigned to the U.S. by the 
U.S.S.R. pursuant to the terms of the Roosevelt-Litivinov 
Agreement.  Belmont’s estate argued that New York state’s property 
laws were supreme over the President’s agreement with the U.S.S.R. 
because the agreement had not been ratified by the Senate and 
therefore was non-binding.237  The Court concluded that because the 
Executive branch had constitutional authority to negotiate and enter 
 
232 Id. at 434.  See also Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454 (Virginia statute of 
limitations on debt collection overridden by peace treaty with U.S. and Great 
Britain after Revolutionary War). 
233 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.  
234 The Roosevelt-Litivinov Agreement established diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union, thereby formally recognizing the government of the U.S.S.R. See 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/fdr-ml.htm.  
235 See U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).  
236 Id. at 331.  
237 Id.  
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into these agreements, the agreements were essentially binding 
treaties that did not require ratification.238   
 
Thus, Congress has the constitutional authority to remedy 
the effects of war and to pass laws to effectuate U.S. treaties and 
agreements entered into by the Executive branch in support of U.S. 
foreign policy.   
 
ii. The Commerce Clause 
 
The Constitution also vests Congress with the power “to 
regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states….”239  In Wickard v. Filburn, a farmer was penalized pursuant 
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 for exceeding the wheat 
quota he was allotted under the Act.240  The farmer argued that the 
extra wheat was strictly for his personal use only, so it was never in 
the stream of interstate commerce and thus not subject to regulation 
by Congress.241  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
Congress can regulate non-commercial intrastate activity, such as 
wheat grown for personal consumption, if, in the aggregate, it may 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce as a whole.242    
 
Over a half a century later, the Supreme Court was presented 
with a similar claim of home grown marijuana used for personal 
medicinal purposes in Gonzales v. Raich.243  While California’s 
state law allowed the petitioners to grow and use their own 
medicinal marijuana, marijuana possession was illegal under 
 
238 Id. at 330 (“Government power over external affairs is not distributed, but is 
vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done 
here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that 
government.”). 
239 U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 8.  
240 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
241 Id.  
242 Id.  
243 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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Congress’ Controlled Substances Act.244 The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the petitioners’ cultivation, 
use, and possession of medical marijuana did not substantially affect 
interstate commerce and therefore was beyond Congress’ power to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause.245 The Court relied heavily 
upon Wickard, noting the strong similarity between the cases and 
stating that “Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure 
to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana 
would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.”246     
 
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ Commerce 
Clause powers more narrowly in the cases of U.S. v. Morrison and 
U.S. v. Lopez.247  In Morrison, the Court held that in order for 
Congress to regulate activity under its Commerce Clause power, the 
activity must be a preexisting activity that is both interstate and 
economic (i.e. commercial) in nature.248  Lopez narrowed the power 
even further by clarifying that Congress must have a rational basis 
for any substantial effect it claims an activity or instrumentality may 
have on interstate commerce, and instrumentalities must be used for 
economic purposes in interstate commerce to fall within Congress’ 
regulatory powers.249        
 
Thus, Congress has the power to regulate any preexisting 
economic instrumentality or activity, including those that are illegal, 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce as long as 





244 Id.  
245 Id.   
246 Id. at 33. 
247 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding the Violence Against 
Women Act was unconstitutional) and U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(holding Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional).   
248 See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
249 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
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iii. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Congress has 
the authority “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”250  Thus, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass laws for 
executing its own enumerated powers and the enumerated powers 
of another branch of Federal Government.   
 
In Woods, discussed supra, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress was well within its constitutional authority to control 
rising rents because it had the power to remedy the effects of war 
under both the war powers and the Necessary and Proper clause.251  
The Court was careful to note that by limiting Congress’ war powers 
strictly to wartime, the Necessary and Proper Clause “would be 
drastically limited in its application to the several war powers,” and 
had previously declined such a narrow interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.252  
 
Therefore, Congress may pass not only laws that are 
necessary and proper for executing its own powers, but also to 
execute powers vested in the other branches of the U.S. 
Government. This would include laws supporting U.S. foreign 
policy determined by the Executive branch pursuant to its 
Constitutional authority.   
 
B.  Article VI-The Supremacy Clause 
 
 
250 U.S. Constit. Article I, § 8. 
251 See Woods v. Cloyd-Miller, supra  note,  at 143.   
252 Id.  
47
Kreder and Schell: The Constitutionality of the HEAR Act: Empowering American Courts to Return Holocaust-Era Artwork and Honor History
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2020
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW VOLUME 30 




Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Constitution and 
“the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land….”253  In Missouri v. Holland, discussed supra, the Supreme 
Court held that a valid treaty between the United States and another 
sovereign nation was the “supreme law of the land” pursuant to the 
language of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, and Congress was 
within its constitutional authority to pass a law to effectuate such a 
treaty.254  
 
Federal preemption of state law derives from the Supremacy 
Clause, which makes federal law the “law of the land.”255  States 
cannot adopt laws that are contradictory to federal law.  The 
Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption: express 
preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict 
preemption.256  With express preemption, Congress expressly states 
that it has preempted state law.  Implied conflict preemption occurs 
when a state law conflicts with federal law, making it impossible to 
comply with both laws, or a state law frustrates the objective of the 
federal law.257  Implied field preemption occurs when Congress’ 
regulation of a particular field is so comprehensive that there is no 
room for the state to regulate in the same field.258  In Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Co., Justice Douglas stated that “[t]he scheme of the 
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
 
253 U.S. Constit. Art. VI.  
254 See Missouri v. Holland, supra.   
255 U.S. Constit. Art. VI.  
256 See Von Saher, supra note at 960.  
257 Id. at 961.  See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (test for 
conflict preemption is “whether the [state] law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”); Amer. Insur. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (conflict 
preemption occurs only when a federal law intrudes upon a traditional state 
responsibility); and Florida Lime Growers and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (requiring “actual conflict between the two schemes 
of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area”)  
258 Id. at 963. 
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inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.  
Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”259  The 
Court has held that “the test of preemption is whether the matter on 
which the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the 
federal government.”260 
 
Congress also may preempt certain defenses when it codifies 
a statute of limitations.  In Petrella v. MGM, the Supreme Court 
considered the issue of whether the doctrine of laches barred a 
copyright infringement claim that was filed within the three year 
statute of limitations under the copyright statute.261 The dispute in 
Petrella centered on a copyright infringement claim for the 
screenplay of Martin Scorsese’s film Raging Bull, and the 
defendant/respondent studio argued that plaintiff/petitioner’s claim 
was barred by laches although her claim was filed timely within the 
three-year statute of limitations period set forth in the Copyright 
Act.262  The Court found the studio’s reliance on the doctrine of 
laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim unpersuasive and held that “in the 
face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot 
be invoked to bar legal relief.”263  In her opinion for the majority, 
Justice Ginsburg noted that “both before and after the merger of law 
and equity in 1938, this Court has cautioned against invoking laches 
to bar legal relief.”264  Focusing on the distinction between legal and 
equitable defenses265 and the separation of powers, the Court 
 
259 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).    
260 Pac. Gas Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation Dev. Comm’n., 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) 
(internal citations omitted). 
261 Petrella v. MGM, 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 679. 
264 Id. at 678.  
265 Id. at 681-682 (“Tolling, which lengthens the time for commencing a civil 
action in appropriate circumstances, applies when there is a statute of 
limitations; it is, in effect, a rule of interpretation tied to that limit.  Laches, in 
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determined that laches was a “gap-filling” measure used by the 
judiciary only when Congress had not designated a statute of 
limitations.266 Both the majority and the dissent pointed out that the 
doctrine of laches applied only in “extraordinary” instances.267  The 
Court cautioned that “[i]nviting individual judges to set a time limit 
other than the one Congress prescribed…would tug against the 
uniformity Congress sought to achieve when it enacted [the 
statute].”268  Most importantly, the Court held that “courts are not at 
liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.”269 
 
 Shortly after the Supreme Court’s holding in Petrella, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defense of laches 
was codified in the patent statute at issue in SCA Hygiene and 
therefore applicable even though the claim had been filed within the 
prescribed statutory of limitations period.270  The Supreme Court 
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s analysis in SCA Hygiene, 
finding no language that the laches defense was codified in the 
statute or applicable to the claim:  “Even if we assume for the sake 
of argument that [the statute] incorporates a laches defense of some 
dimension, it does not necessarily follow that this defense may be 
invoked to bar a claim for damages incurred within the period set 
out in the [statute].”271 The Court applied its holding in Petrella to 
SCA Hygiene and reiterated that “[t]he enactment of a statute of 
 
contrast, originally served as a guide when no statute of limitations controlled 
the claim; it can scarcely be described as a rule for interpreting a statutory 
prescription.”) (internal citations omitted). 
266 Id. at 680 (“We have never applied laches to bar in their entirety claims for 
discrete wrongs occurring within a federally prescribed limitations period.”) 
267 Id. at 667-8 (“As to equitable relief, in extraordinary circumstances, laches 
may bar at the very threshold the particular relief requested by the plaintiff.”). 
Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[Laches] applies in those extraordinary cases 
where the plaintiff ‘unreasonably delays in filing a suit.’”) (Internal citations 
omitted).  
268 Id. at 681. 
269 Id. at 667. 
270 See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 137 S. Ct. 
954, 963 (2017). 
271 Id.  
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limitations necessarily reflects a congressional decision that the 
timeliness of covered claims is better judged on the basis of a 
generally hard and fast rule rather than the sort of case-specific 
judicial determination that occurs when a laches defense is asserted.  
Therefore applying laches within a limitations period specified by 
Congress would give judges a ‘legislation-overriding role’ that is 
beyond the Judiciary’s power.”272  Given that the Court described 
its holding in Petrella as “broad,”273 it appears these precedents will 
apply to any statute of limitations prescribed by Congress.274   
 
Though federal law is supreme, there are limits to 
Congressional power, one of which is that it cannot conflict with the 
principles of federalism.  Supreme Court precedent is clear that 
Congress cannot utilize its constitutional authority to commandeer, 
force, or coerce state governments to take action.275  But, Congress 
does have the power to establish a uniform statute of limitations for 
a class of cases, especially if those cases are interfering with federal 
interests, including international affairs. 
 
C.  The Tenth Amendment 
 
 
272 Id. at 960 (internal citations omitted). 
273 Id.  
274 The question of whether the Court’s holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene 
apply to the HEAR Act is now before the Supreme Court for consideration on a 
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Lauren Zuckerman in Zuckerman v. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art.  
275 See, generally, New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that 
Congress’ Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 
1985 punished states that did not comply and regulated a state’s regulation of 
toxic waste, which amounted to commandeering); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 
(1997) (holding that Congress cannot commandeer state executive branch 
officials to enforce a Federal law (the Brady Bill) by performing background 
checks on purchasers of firearms); and Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 
(2018) (holding the PASPA Act unconstitutional because it prohibited states 
from legalizing sports gambling, thereby commandeering them).    
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The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”276  Traditionally, the regulation of property has been within 
the purview of the States and would fall under those powers not 
“prohibited” by the Constitution to the States.277  As discussed 
supra, there are exceptions to this rule when it conflicts with the 
Federal Government’s exclusive authority to remedy the effects of 
war, comply with international treaties and agreements, and regulate 
interstate and international commerce, or when a federal law 
expressly or impliedly preempts a state law.278      
 
Since the war and foreign affairs powers are vested 
exclusively in the Federal Government pursuant to Articles I and II, 
the States are prohibited from engaging in the exercise of foreign 
affairs or war powers, which require federal control.  Even though 
the States were independent sovereigns prior to ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution, the States relinquished their foreign affairs and 
war powers in order to become part of the union.  Likewise, the 
States are prohibited from regulating interstate and international 
commerce because these activities require federal control to 
maintain the union.   
 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT 
 
The HEAR Act does not create any cause of action or claim; 
it merely extends the statute of limitations period to six years from 
 
276 U.S. Constit. amend. X.   
277 See Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964. 
278 See generally Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493 (1870) (Congress had power to 
toll state statute of limitations due to Civil War); Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454 
(Virginia statute of limitations on debt collection overridden by peace treaty 
with U.S. and Great Britain after Revolutionary War); and Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010) (Federal foreign policy 
regarding restitution for Holocaust victims of Nazi looted art preempts 
California statute of limitations). 
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the time of actual discovery.279  Therefore, the key operative 
provision is Section 5(a), which outlines the uniform statute of 
limitations applicable to Holocaust expropriated art.280  Because the 
provision arguably interferes with the States’ rights to regulate 
property, this provision may be subject to a constitutional 
challenge.281  Even if such a challenge makes it to the courts, the Act 
ultimately will be upheld as constitutional for the reasons outlined 
infra.       
 
A.  Congress has the authority to remedy the effects of World War 
II, including the restitution of Holocaust expropriated art to its 
rightful owners, decades after the war ended.  
 
There is no dispute that the Nazis’ expropriation of art from 
Jews and other minorities who did not fit the Aryan ideal was a 
direct and immediate cause of World War II.  The Nazis engaged in 
a systematic plan designed for the sole purpose of stripping Jews 
and other minorities of their property, identities, and, ultimately, 
their lives in order to fill the coffers of the economically depressed 
Nazi state and achieve its goal of Aryanization.  The Nazis stole so 
much art during their reign of terror that their theft has been 
characterized as “the greatest displacement of art in human 
history.”282  And, much of that art is still displaced and separated 




281 See generally William L. Charron, The Problem of Purely Procedural 
Preemption Presented by the Federal HEAR Act, 2018 Pepp. L. Rev. 19 (2018) 
(HEAR Act preempts state property laws on a purely procedural basis and 
therefore violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the 
principles of federalism); and Jason Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art 
Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016: A Federal Reform to State Statutes of 
Limitations for Art Restitution Claims, Colum. J. Transnational Law (2018) 
(HEAR act violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
282 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 2 (2016) (quoting Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust 
Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts 202 (NYU Press 2003)) 
(footnote omitted).   
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ended.283  As discussed supra, the rightful owners face many 
obstacles in pursuing these claims, including the passage of time, 
the lack of documentation and information, and the existence of 
legal procedural bars.    
 
The Constitution is clear that war powers are exclusive to the 
Federal Government, and Supreme Court precedent confirms that 
Congress has the authority to pass laws that are necessary and proper 
to facilitate its war powers, including laws to remedy the effects of 
war even after the war has ended.  Because the Constitution 
expressly grants this authority to Congress and the Executive 
branch, it prohibits the States from exercising any war powers, 
including the power to remedy the effects of war.  The Ninth Circuit 
held in Von Saher I that California did not have the authority to 
remedy the effects of the Holocaust, no matter how noble its 
intentions were, because that power is vested exclusively in the 
Federal government.284  Therefore, the responsibility for remedying 
the effects of the Holocaust, including the restitution of Nazi-looted 
art, rests solely in the Federal Government.       
 
If Congress had the constitutional power to toll a State’s 
statute of limitations due to the effects of the Civil War, it surely has 
the power to extend a State’s statute of limitations to remedy the 
horrific consequences of World War II.285  And, according to 
Woods, it has the authority to remedy the evils of the Nazi regime, 
which were a direct and immediate cause of the war, decades after 
the war ended.286 Congress has acted to remedy other effects of 
World War II by passing legislation to control rents in certain areas 
 
283 An estimated 100,000 to 300,000 Nazi-looted artworks are still missing.  See 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-one-should-trade-in-or-possess-
art-stolen-by-the-nazis/2019/01/02/01990232-0ed3-11e9-831f-
3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html; and  
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/can-you-hear-me-now-holocaust-
expropriated-art-recovery-hear-act. 
284 See Von Saher, supra note 
285 See Stewart v. Kahn, supra note  
286 See Woods supra note 
54
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol30/iss1/1
KREDER AND SCHELL: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT: EMPOWERING AMERICAN COURTS TO RETURN 
HOLOCAUST-ERA ARTWORK AND HONOR HISTORY 
2020]    THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HEAR ACT 55 
 
 
during the war; to stabilize rents following the return of GIs en 
masse at the end of the war; and paying reparations to the Japanese 
internment camp survivors over forty years after the war ended.287  
Certainly, Congress can rely on the same war powers to create a 
nationwide uniform statute of limitations which provides Holocaust 
victims with additional time in which to bring claims of Holocaust 
expropriated art.    
 
Even though it does not create a claim or cause of action, the 
HEAR Act attempts to remedy the effects of the Nazi regime’s 
thievery by creating a uniform window of opportunity for victims to 
pursue their claims on the merits.288  The HEAR Act deals with a 
very unique and disturbing circumstance resulting directly from the 
machinations and manipulation of the Nazi regime during World 
War II:  the systematic expropriation of art, which sadly has 
continued to the present day due to governments, museums, 
collectors, and others who are willing to ignore the facts and look 
the other way when dealing with this art. 
 
A nation which sacrificed many lives of its citizens in a war 
to defeat one of the most horrific genocidal and criminal regimes in 
the history of the world “is under no constitutional necessity” to 
ensure that states’ statutes of limitations continue to provide 
unlawful owners of stolen property with the opportunity to utilize 
procedural defenses under the guise of equity and states’ rights.289  
Both the States and the unlawful owners in these cases are well 
aware of the basic property premise that one cannot get title from a 
 
287 See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. no. 77-421 (1942) 
(Congressional authorization of rent control in designated areas during World 
War II); Housing and Rent Act of 1947 (Congressional authorization of rent 
control and preferential treatment in housing sales for returning WWII GIs); and 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. no. 100-383 (1988) (Congressional 
authorization of reparations to World War II Japanese internment camp 
victims).  
288 See HEAR  
289 See Bowles, supra, note 218.    
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thief.  And, their constitutional rights are in no way violated by the 
creation of a uniform statute of limitations for these claims.     
  
B.  Congress has the power to pass legislation to effectuate treaties 
and agreements in furtherance of U.S. policy as determined by the 
Executive branch.   
 
The Constitution also vests the power of foreign affairs 
exclusively in the Executive and Legislative branches.  The 
Executive branch dictates foreign policy through the State 
Department, and the Senate, by a two-thirds concurrence, approves 
any treaties the Executive branch may negotiate.  Congress has the 
power through the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass laws to 
effectuate valid agreements and treaties negotiated by the Executive 
branch and approved by the Senate.  
 
In 1998, Congress passed (and the President signed) the 
Holocaust Victims Redress Act (“HVRA”) to ensure that the U.S. 
was fulfilling its obligation for restitution of assets to Holocaust 
victims pursuant to the Paris Agreement for Reparations of 1946 and 
the 1907 Hague Convention, both binding and valid treaties entered 
into by the United States.290  With this legislation, Congress 
expressed its sense that all governments should make a good faith 
effort to return Nazi-looted art to its rightful owners.291  While the 
legislative history and text do not reveal its constitutional authority, 
the treaty powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause are the 
obvious constitutional authority supporting Congress’ passage of 
the HVRA.292    
 
Later that same year, Congress passed (and the President 
signed) the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, which 
created the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets 
 
290 See HVRA supra note  
291 Id.  
292 Id.  
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in the United States.293  Congress authorized this commission to 
perform specific duties related to the collection and disposition of 
Holocaust victims’ assets, one of which was “to coordinate its 
activities with private and governmental entities (including the 
international Washington Conference on Holocaust-era Assets).”294  
Even though the Washington Conference was not a treaty, Congress 
still had constitutional authority to pass this legislation as a 
necessary and proper means to execute the power of foreign affairs 
vested in the Executive branch’s State Department, which agreed to 
the principles set forth in the Washington Conference.295  The 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Missouri v. Holland and U.S. v. 
Belmont, both discussed supra, support Congressional action to 
effectuate valid treaties and agreements in furtherance of U.S. 
foreign policy.296   
 
The legislative history of the HEAR Act does not explicitly 
state that Congress relied upon its foreign affairs powers in the 
passage of the Act. However, it is obvious from the findings 
described therein that Congress relied heavily upon the Federal 
Government’s foreign affairs powers in its passage of the Act.297  
Even though the Washington Conference Principles and the Terezin 
Declaration are agreements, they were agreed to by the State 
Department and should be recognized as supreme even though they 
do not require ratification in accordance with Article 2, Section 2.  
These agreements were entered into pursuant to the foreign powers 
authority vested in the Executive branch and do not require 
concurrence of the Senate to be the supreme law of the land.298  
 
293 See US Holocaust Assets Commission Act, Pub. L. no. 105-186, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
294 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senate-bill/1900. 
295 See U.S. v. Belmont, supra note 
296 See Missouri v. Holland and U.S. v. Belmont, supra notes  
297 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5 (2016) (“Yet states have been unable to remedy 
this injustice because the regulation of war-related disputes is within the powers 
of the Federal Government.”) (footnote omitted). 
298 See U.S. v. Belmont supra 
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In the case of Holocaust expropriated art, it would be 
unconstitutional and insufficient to rely upon the States to deal with 
an issue of this magnitude involving foreign policy.299  Most States 
will not see these claims in their courts, but those States that do 
should not have to waste time and resources, as California did, 
revising their statutes if the Federal Government can remedy the 
situation using its foreign affairs powers.300  The HEAR Act 
remedies this problem by creating a uniform statute of limitations, 
thereby eliminating the choice of law problem that often occurs in 
these claims.  In doing so, the HEAR Act aligns current U.S. foreign 
policy with the principles it agreed to in the Washington Conference 
and the Terezin Declaration, assuring that Holocaust expropriated 
art claims will be adjudicated on the merits only.301    
 
C.  Nazi-looted art is a commodity in both interstate and 
international commerce, and therefore is subject to regulation by 
Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.  
 
Holocaust-expropriated art, like wheat and marijuana, is a 
commodity traded in both interstate and international commerce; 
thus it is subject to federal regulation pursuant to the Constitution.302  
Similar to the market for marijuana, there is also a black market for 
art.303  Holocaust expropriated art is sometimes in the stream of 
 
299 See U.S. v. Belmont, supra 
300 Subsequent to the ruling in Von Saher, California revised its statute to 
include all claims for stolen art work, not just Holocaust-expropriated art.  The 
statute was later upheld as constitutional. See S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 5, note 26 
(2016).   
301 The HEAR Act also dovetails with previous executive policy dating back to 
World War II, including the Monuments Men, Military Government Law 59, 
the London Declaration, FBI seizures in the 1950s, and government seizures 
increasing in frequency since Portrait of Wally was seized.     
302 U.S. Constit., Art. II, § 8. 
303 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding, inter alia, that Congress 
has the power to regulate commerce in both legal and illegal markets); Von 
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Tracking the provenance of Nazi-looted art is nearly impossible, since many 
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commerce at the time a claim is made by a Holocaust victim or her 
heir, but oftentimes it is in the possession of private collectors, 
museums, and the like. Whether artwork is on the auction block or 
held in a collection, it is still a commodity in interstate and 
international commerce, and often of tremendous financial value.   
 
If the Nazi-looted art at issue in these cases is kept out of the 
stream of commerce, demand and prices increase astronomically as 
each year passes.304 As a result, unlawful owners may gain an 
inflated sense of entitlement to the art due to its increased monetary 
and cultural value stemming from the natural ebb and flow of supply 
and demand. In turn, unlawful owners may be increasingly 
unwilling to return the art to its rightful owner, particularly if its 
value has skyrocketed over the years. Rightful owners of Holocaust 
expropriated art are often prevented from discovering and 
recovering their property, which is why the Federal Government 
enacted the HEAR Act to comply with federal foreign policy on the 
restitution of Holocaust expropriated art.305  Therefore, Congress 
has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate Nazi-
looted art through the HEAR Act, even if such art is not produced 
for sale and is utilized merely for personal reasons because, if taken 
in the aggregate, such art has a substantial effect on both the legal 
and illegal interstate art market and the international art market.   
 
 
changes of ownership went undocumented, and most of the transactions took 
place on the black market.”) (internal citation omitted); and Guggenheim v. 
Lubbell, 77 N.Y.2d. 311, 314, 320 (N.Y. 1991) (illicit market for stolen art is 
“an industry all its own” and placing burden on true owner to locate stolen art 
encourages illicit trade).   
304 See also Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 
Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. Rev. 
363, 380 (2019).   
305 See also Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 
Act of 2016: An Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, U. Ill. Rev. 
363, 379-382 (2019).    
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D.  The Federal Government has the power to preempt state 
statute of limitations laws due to the unique and horrific 
circumstances of World War II and the Holocaust.  
 
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the Federal Government 
has the authority to preempt state statute of limitations laws due to 
the unique and horrific circumstances of World War II in an effort 
to make the process for pursuing claims of Holocaust expropriated 
art more just.  In Von Saher I, the Ninth Circuit conducted a field 
preemption analysis on California’s statute extending the statute of 
limitations for Holocaust expropriated art claims and determined 
that the statute was an unconstitutional assumption of the Federal 
Government’s foreign affairs powers to remedy the effects of World 
War II.306  The Ninth Circuit held that restitution of Nazi-looted art 
was within the exclusive purview of the Federal Government under 
its foreign affairs powers, and there was no room for the state of 
California to regulate in this area.307  Presumably taking no issue 
with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court denied Von 
Saher’s petition for certiorari in June of 2011.308   
 
306 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
307 Id.  
308 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).  Shortly 
after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, California amended its statute to extend its 
statute of limitations on stolen art from three to six years and to require actual 
discovery of the artwork and its location before the statute began to run.  See 
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 754 F.3d 712, 718-719 (9th Cir. 
2014).  After the statute was amended, von Saher filed a first amended 
complaint, which was dismissed by the District Court upon the Museum’s 
motion to dismiss.  Id. at 719.  The District Court agreed with the Museum’s 
argument that Von Saher’s “specific claims and the remedies she 
sought…conflicted with the United States’ express federal policy on recovered 
art.” Id.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Von Saher’s claims “[did] not 
conflict with any federal policy because the Cranachs were never subject to 
postwar internal restitution proceedings in the Netherlands, as noted in the 
complaint, the district court's order and the opinion of the Court of Appeals of 
The Hague.” Id. at 721.  The Museum’s petition for certiorari was denied by the 
Supreme Court in January 2015.  When the District Court granted the 
Museum’s motion for summary judgment, Von Saher appealed to the Ninth 
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Under a field preemption analysis, the HEAR Act is 
constitutional because the Federal Government has impliedly 
regulated the area of Holocaust expropriated art through its 
constitutional foreign affairs and war powers, leaving no room for 
the States to take action. Leaving the issue to the States to resolve 
has resulted in many cases being unjustly decided on purely 
procedural defenses instead of on the merits of the claims.  Thus, the 
HEAR Act preempts the states’ regulation of property in this very 
narrow field of Holocaust expropriated art in order to remedy this 
unfortunate result and allow the courts to hear these claims on the 
merits.309     
 
Circuit for a third time.  See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 897 
F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment, finding that the act of state doctrine applied but no 
exceptions to the act of state doctrine applied.  Id.  The Supreme Court denied 
von Saher’s second petition for certiorari in 2018.       
The Ninth Circuit is known for being the most overturned U.S. Court of 
Appeals by the United States Supreme Court.  Given this fact along with the 
makeup of the Court, there was a high likelihood that the Supreme Court would 
have accepted Von Saher’s petitions had they thought the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis was wrong either in 2011 or 2018. Of note, the Supreme Court 
accepted a petition for certiorari on the issue of state sovereignty submitted in 
the same term as Von Saher’s second petition for certiorari (the third petition for 
certiorari in the case).  See generally Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 
___ (2019) (holding that a state cannot be sued in another state’s courts).  It 
seems likely the Court would have accepted Von Saher’s first petition in 2011 if 
the Justices thought the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was incorrect because Von 
Saher’s first petition focused on the issues of states’ rights and federal 
preemption.         
309 This is exactly what Justice Handler suggested in his dissent in O’Keeffe: 
“The better approach, I would suggest, is one that enables the parties to get to 
the merits of the controversy. It would recognize an artist's or owner's right to 
assert a claim against a newly-revealed receiver or possessor of stolen art as 
well as the correlative right of such a possessor to assert all equitable and legal 
defenses. This would enable the parties to concentrate directly upon entitlement 
to the artwork rather than entitlement to bring a lawsuit. By dealing with the 
merits of the claims instead of the right to sue, such an approach would be more 
conducive to reconciling the demands for individual justice with societal needs 
to discourage art thievery. In addition, such a rule would comport more closely 
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The outcome would be the same under a conflict preemption 
analysis.  Any state statutes that provide a claimant of Holocaust 
expropriated art with a statute of limitations that is less than six years 
from the date of actual discovery would be in direct conflict with the 
HEAR Act.  This would include any state statutes that apply 
constructive and imputed knowledge to the heirs of Holocaust 
victims, which does not comport with the actual knowledge 
requirement of the HEAR Act.  These types of statutes would 
directly conflict with the second purpose of the HEAR Act, which 
is “to ensure that claims are not unfairly barred by statutes of 
limitations and are resolved in a just and fair manner” and would 
frustrate Congress’ objective in effectuating U.S. foreign policy.310  
Thus, the HEAR Act would preempt these types of state statutes 
because they frustrate the objectives of Congress in its enactment of 
the HEAR Act.  Alternatively, in most cases, it would be impossible 
to comply with both the state and federal statute.  A shorter state 
statute of limitation would bar the claim, although it may not be 
time-barred under the HEAR Act.  And a state that allows for 
constructive and imputed knowledge would conflict with the HEAR 
Act’s definitions of actual discovery and knowledge.  Thus, the 
HEAR Act would preempt a state statute under these scenarios as 
well.   
 
Another form of preemption may occur when Congress has 
prescribed a statute of limitations, thereby barring the use of 
equitable defenses like laches.  According to the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene, a laches defense is 
preempted when Congress prescribes a statute of limitations because 
a court cannot override the legislative authority of Congress, and 
 
with traditional common law values emphasizing the paramountcy of the rights 
of a true owner of chattels as against others whose possession is derived from 
theft. Simultaneously, it would acknowledge that the claims of the true owner as 
against subsequent converters may in appropriate circumstances be 
counterbalanced by equitable considerations.” O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 
508 (N.J. 1980) (Handler, J. dissenting).   
310 HEAR Act 
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equitable defenses are not applicable in the context of a statutorily 
defined statute of limitations.311  Like the copyright and patent 
statutes at issue in those cases, the HEAR Act codifies a prescribed 
statute of limitations for Holocaust expropriated art claims and is 
silent on whether equitable defenses such as laches may be used to 
bar claims brought under the statute of limitations.312 Despite the 
issue of Congressional intent in removing the bar on the laches 
defense in the HEAR Act, SCA Hygiene confirms that laches still is 
not an available defense even if the statute contains express or 
implied language allowing its use.313  Under the precedents of 
Petrella and SCA Hygiene, the HEAR Act may preempt the use of 
the laches doctrine in defense of Holocaust expropriated art 
claims.314     
 
When federal and state courts uphold the use of the laches 
doctrine in claims filed under the HEAR Act, they are overriding 
Congressional authority expressly prohibited by Petrella.315  Such 
 
311 See Petrella, supra note;  See SCA Hygiene, supra note   
312 As discussed in Section II, an early version of the Senate bill specifically 
precluded equitable defenses and laches, but this language was removed by the 
Senate in an amendment with no explanation as to why it was removed.  See S. 
Rep. No. 114-394, at 7 (2016).  Herbert Lazerow interprets the language of the 
HEAR Act to mean that equitable defenses, including laches, are still available 
because the statute only mentions “defenses at law.” Herbert L. Lazerow, 
Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 
51 Int’l Law 195 (2018).  Frankel and Sharoni, however, rely upon statutory 
construction principles and argue that if language is removed from the bill, then 
it “may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”  Frankel & Sharoni, 
Navigating the HEAR Act of 2016, 42 Colum. J.L. & Arts 157 (2019). The 
Second Circuit relied heavily upon Frankel and Sharoni’s article in its opinion 
affirming that the laches defense applied in Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.  See Zuckerman, 928 F.3d 186 (2d. Cir. 2019).  Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent in Petrella that “silence [in a statute] is consistent, not 
inconsistent, with the application of equitable doctrines.” Petrella at 694.   
313 See SCA Hygiene, supra note 
314 Petrella and SCA Hygiene involved copyright and patent statutes which are 
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts, unlike the state statute of limitations 
that are preempted by the HEAR Act.   
315 See Petrella, supra note   
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judicial override defeats the intent of Congress to create a uniform 
statute of limitations for these claims and to align U.S. law with its 
existing foreign policy on Holocaust expropriated art.316  Further, 
allowing individual judges to determine whether laches applies in 
these cases has resulted in the uneven application of the HEAR Act.  
As the cases of Reif and Zuckerman clearly demonstrate, the case by 
case determination of whether laches applies results in divergent 
outcomes—some claimants’ cases are heard on the merits while 
others are dismissed before the merits are reached.  In fact, the 
Second Circuit recognized that divergent outcomes would occur 
when it affirmed the laches defense in Zuckerman: “[W]hile the 
laches defense succeeds here, in other cases it will fail and not 
impede recovery for claims brought pursuant to the HEAR Act.”317  
Allowing judges to dismiss these cases due to laches heavily 
disadvantages the claimants by depriving them of the opportunity to 
have their claims heard on the merits, which is the overarching 
purpose of the HEAR Act.318  If state and federal courts continue to 
dismiss these claims based on laches, then the HEAR Act is, for the 
most part, nullified by judicial override.  As Justice Ginsberg 
indicated in Petrella, plaintiffs must “sue now or forever hold your 
peace” when laches are allowed in the face of a Congressionally 
designated statute of a limitations.319  Congress was trying to avoid 
this very scenario when it enacted the HEAR Act because claimants 
were losing their right to sue due to discrepancies in statute of 
limitations and the discovery rule among the states.320  Thus, the 
 
316 See Petrella, supra note   at 680-681.  
317 Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 197 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
318 HEAR 
319 See Petrella, supra note at 682. 
320 “The HEAR Act thus serves two purposes: first, to ensure that laws 
governing claims to Nazi-confiscated art and other property further United 
States policy as set forth in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin 
Declaration; and, second, to ensure that claims to artwork and other property 
stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis are not unfairly barred by statutes of 
limitations but are resolved in a just and fair manner.”  S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 
6 (2016). 
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only way to avoid the separation of powers problem inherent in the 
judicial override of the HEAR Act and to fulfill the intent of 
Congress to align U.S. law with its long-standing foreign policy and 
to ensure these claims are heard on the merits is preemption of the 
laches defense by the statute of limitations set forth in the HEAR 
Act.321   
 
Congress, pursuant to its constitutionally enumerated 
powers, has impliedly occupied the entire field of Holocaust 
expropriated art by creating a uniform statute of limitations and 
strictly defining actual discovery, thereby leaving no room for the 
States to regulate in this very narrow and specific area.  
Additionally, most state statutes of limitations, with the exception 
of New York, would directly conflict with and frustrate the 
objectives of Congress in its enactment of the HEAR Act.  Further, 
certain equitable defenses may be preempted when Congress 
prescribes a statute of limitations, as it has in the HEAR Act.  
Therefore, the HEAR Act must preempt any state statute of 
limitations and the use of the laches defense.   
 
Finally, Congress has not commandeered the States in the 
HEAR Act.  There is no language in the statute that directs the States 
to take any action.322  In fact, the language of the operative provision 
Section 5 (a) is permissive.323 The only mandatory language used in 
the statute pertains to “possible misidentification” under Section 
5(b) and the limitations of the Act outlined in subsections (c) 
through (f).324  There is no evidence that Congress has attempted to 
 
321 The preemption issue will be decided by the Supreme Court if it accepts 
Zuckerman’s petition for writ of certiorari in Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. See note   , supra.   
322 See HEAR Act. 
323 See Id. (“[A] civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any 
artwork or other property that was lost during the covered period because of 
Nazi persecution may be commenced not later than 6 years….”) (emphasis 
added).   
324  See Id.  
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commandeer the States or their courts by extending the statute of 
limitations for these very unique and limited claims.  And, there is 
no evidence that the States have objected to the uniform statute of 
limitations and definition of actual discovery set forth in the HEAR 
Act. 
 
Nor does the HEAR Act command state courts to hear cases 
they otherwise would not, i.e. claims of title by adverse 
possession.325  Because all states except New Jersey326 follow the 
common law discussed supra, there was no need for Congress to 
pass a new federal conversion statute to cover such claims.  Simply 
put, one cannot get title from a thief.327  Therefore, no state courts 
 
325 Herbert Lazerow posits that if a current possessor has acquired a Holocaust 
expropriated artwork by adverse possession upon expiration of a state statute 
prior to the enactment of HEAR, then the HEAR Act violates the Takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by extending the state 
statute of limitations to allow the rightful owner to take action against the 
adverse possessor.  Herbert L. Lazerow, Holocaust Art Disputes: The Holocaust 
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 51 Int’l Law 195 (2018) at 28.  But, the 
law is clear that one cannot get legal title from a thief even through adverse 
possession.  See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d. Cir. 2010).  Only in New 
Jersey may a thief or subsequent good-faith purchaser acquire legal title to 
stolen artwork through adverse possession upon expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (N.J. 1980).  While Lazerow’s 
theory is beyond the scope of this article, Justice Handler identified the inherent 
problem with granting legal title by adverse possession in his dissent in 
O’Keeffe: “[T]he majority's view, derived from an affidavit, that stability of 
possession and title is as important in the world of art as it is in the field of 
commercial sales and, indeed, is so important that it requires a rule that will, 
more often than not, settle title to stolen art in the hands of an ultimate possessor 
whether he or she be truly innocent, simply lucky, just plain cunning, or actually 
larcenous….No persuasive reasons are advanced for the view that this notion of 
"stability," which would serve in many cases actually to legitimatize art theft, is 
more important than is the return of stolen unique, artistic creations to their 
creator or true owner when this is justified by equitable considerations.”  Id. at 
512. (Handler, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted).   
326 See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (N.J. 1980).   
327 Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 149 (2d. Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring) 
(“Under American law and the law of many foreign states there is only one 
scenario in which a good faith purchaser’s claim of title is immediately 
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other than those in New Jersey would have considered claims to title 
by adverse possession upon expiration of the statute of limitations 
prior to, or after, the HEAR Act.  
 
E.  The Constitution expressly prohibits the States from engaging 
in foreign affairs. 
 
The Tenth Amendment expressly prohibits the States from 
engaging in matters of foreign affairs because those powers are 
vested exclusively in the Federal Government pursuant to Articles I 
and II of the Constitution.328   Foreign policy is a function that was 
rescinded from the States and vested fully in the Federal 
Government when the States joined the union upon ratification of 
the Constitution.329  As Congress expressed in its findings, the 
HEAR Act is intended to effectuate U.S. foreign policy with regard 
to the principles and goals of the Washington Conference and the 
Terezin Declaration to ensure that Holocaust expropriated art claims 
are adjudicated on the merits only.330 By creating a uniform statute 
of limitations that preempts the States’ statute of limitations, 
Congress is ensuring that all adjudications of these very special 
claims align with the goals of U.S. foreign policy in restitution of 
Holocaust expropriated art.   
 
In sum, Congress and the Executive Branch were acting well 
within the authority of their constitutionally enumerated powers in 





recognized over that of the original owner. This scenario arises when the owner 
voluntarily parts with possession by the creation of a bailment, the bailee 
converts the chattel, and the nature of the bailment allows a reasonable buyer to 
conclude that the bailee is empowered to pass the owner’s title.”). 
328 See U.S. Constit., supra note 
329 See U.S. Const. art. I, IV, and VI and U.S. Const. amend. X and XI. 
330 S. Rep. No. 114-394, at 6 (2016). 
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 V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The HEAR Act is constitutional and does not violate the 
principles of federalism.  States do not have the authority to remedy 
the effects of war, enter into treaties or agreements with foreign 
nations, or regulate interstate and international commerce.  While 
property regulation is traditionally within the purview of the States, 
there is a wide variance of time periods and knowledge requirements 
in the state statutes of limitations, making it difficult for the United 
States to comply with the Washington Conference and the Terezin 
Declaration that Holocaust expropriated art claims be adjudicated 
on the merits.  By creating a federal uniform statute of limitations 
for Holocaust-expropriated art claims and defining actual discovery 
and knowledge, the HEAR Act empowers both state and federal 
courts to hear these claims on the merits and not dismiss them on 
procedural defenses.  It returns the focus to a more just imperative 
where the lost heritage of those who were persecuted by the Nazi 
regime may be restored.  The HEAR Act provides Holocaust victims 
and their heirs with a more expansive window of opportunity to have 
their stories heard in American courts, instead of rejected under the 
guise of equity and procedural defenses that unfairly operate in favor 
of the unlawful owners.  
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